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Besides being a beautiful idea, device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) is probably
the ultimate solution to defeat quantum hacking. To guarantee security, it requires, however, that
the fair-sampling loophole is closed, which results in a very limited maximum achievable distance.
To overcome this limitation, DIQKD must be furnished with fair-sampling devices like, for instance,
qubit amplifiers. These devices can herald the arrival of a photon to the receiver and thus decouple
channel loss from the selection of the measurement settings. Consequently, one can safely post-
select the heralded events and discard the rest, which results in a significant enhancement of the
achievable distance. In this work, we investigate photonic-based DIQKD assisted by two main types
of qubit amplifiers in the finite data block size scenario, and study the resources—particularly, the
detection efficiency of the photodetectors and the quality of the entanglement sources—that would
be necessary to achieve long-distance DIQKD within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of quantum mechanics for cryptographic
means was first proposed in the early 70’s by Stephen
Wiesner, aiming to create unfalsifiable banknotes [1]. In-
spired by this seminal work, Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard introduced a protocol to securely distribute
cryptographic keys [2]. Nowadays, intense theoretical
and experimental research [3–5] has turned this latter
task—called quantum key distribution (QKD)—into a
feasible commercial solution [6].
Despite such tremendous progress, a major flaw of
QKD today is the existing big gap between the theory
and the practice. This is so because security proofs of
QKD typically rely on simple mathematical models to
describe the behaviour of the different physical devices.
As a result, any departure from these models might ren-
der real-life QKD implementations vulnerable to quan-
tum hacking attacks [7–13].
To overcome this problem, the ultimate solution proba-
bly is device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [14–19]. Given
that the users’ devices are honest [20, 21], DIQKD can
guarantee security without characterizing the internal
functioning of the apparatuses, thereby ruling out all
hacking attacks against the physical implementation. It
is based on a feature of some entangled states known as
nonlocality [22], which guarantees that two distant par-
ties (say, Alice and Bob) sharing an ideal nonlocal quan-
tum state observe perfectly correlated outcomes when
performing adequate quantum measurements on their
shares. Moreover, these correlations are monogamous,
i.e., the measurement outcomes are statistically inde-
pendent of any pre-existing information held by a third
party. This property can be verified with a two-party
Bell test [22–27] known as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) test, which basically consists of repeatedly
playing a two-party nonlocal game [19, 28]. The winning
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rate of the game indicates the amount of monogamous
correlations shared between Alice and Bob.
The security of DIQKD has been rigorously established
in different works, first against collective attacks [15] in
the asymptotic regime, then against coherent attacks [17]
also in the asymptotic regime, and only recently in the
practical scenario of finite data block sizes [28] (see
also [29]). The security proof in [28] relies on the so-
called entropy accumulation theorem [30, 31], which ef-
fectively allows to prove the security of the full protocol
from the security of a single round of the protocol by
using a worst-case scenario.
Security proofs require, however, that two fundamen-
tal loopholes are closed: the locality loophole [22] and the
fair-sampling loophole [22, 32, 33]. The former is closed
by enforcing a proper isolation of Alice’s and Bob’s de-
vices. Closing the fair-sampling loophole is more tricky,
specially if Alice and Bob wish to cover long distances.
Indeed, if an adversary were able to correlate channel loss
to Alice’s or Bob’s measurement settings, such an ad-
versary could easily fake nonlocal correlations, and thus
compromise the security of the distilled key. A simple
solution is to assign a pre-established outcome value to
each lost signal while running the CHSH test. The main
drawback of this technique is however the limited achiev-
able distance, because such mapping translates loss into
errors. Indeed, with such an approach, even if the en-
tanglement source could generate perfect Bell pairs and
Alice and Bob could measure them with unit efficiency
detectors, channel loss would limit the maximum DIQKD
transmission distance to about only 3.5 km for a typical
optical fiber.
To enhance the distance, Alice and Bob need to use
fair-sampling devices. These are devices that herald the
arrival of a signal to the receiver, allowing a fair post-
selection of the heralded events. Then, if Alice and Bob
choose their measurement settings a posteriori, i.e., once
their fair-sampling devices have declared the reception of
a signal, they actually decouple channel loss from their
measurement settings selection, thus paving the way for
DIQKD over long distances.
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2A fair-sampling device particularly suited for DIQKD
is a qubit amplifier [34–36], which basically consists of a
teleportation gate. That is, a successful heralding corre-
sponds to the teleportation of the state of the arriving
signal to a signal at the output port of the qubit am-
plifier. DIQKD supported by qubit amplifiers has been
analysed in [34–38] in the asymptotic regime, i.e., by
considering an infinite number of signals. In this work,
we focus on the practical finite data block size scenario.
More precisely, we study finite-key DIQKD with the two
different types of qubit amplifier architectures introduced
in [35] and [36]. We pay particular attention to the ef-
fect that typical device imperfections (specially, the fi-
nite detection efficiency of the photodetectors and the
multi-photon pulses emitted by practical entanglement
light sources) have on the performance of the system. In
doing so, we determine the resources needed to achieve
long-distance implementations of DIQKD within a rea-
sonable time frame of signal transmission.
The structure of the paper goes as follows. Sec. II
introduces the mathematical models that we use to char-
acterize the behaviour of the difference physical de-
vices. Sec. III contains the description of the considered
DIQKD protocol, and Sec. IV introduces its secret key
rate formula for the finite-key regime. Then, in Sec. V
we present the main contributions of this paper. Here,
we evaluate the performance of the DIQKD scheme as
a function of the data block size and various device im-
perfections for two different qubit amplifier architectures.
Finally, Sec. VI summarizes the main conclusions. The
paper includes a few appendices with complementary re-
sults and calculations.
II. TOOLBOX
We begin by briefly introducing the mathematical
models that we use in our analysis. They describe the
main optical devices employed in a photonic implemen-
tation of a DIQKD setup, together with the behaviour of
a typical lossy quantum channel.
A. Photonic sources
We will consider two types of light sources. The first
one emits a coherent superposition of bipartite entangled
states with the following form
|ψ〉ab =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|φn〉ab, (1)
where pn, with
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1, stands for the probability
of generating a 2n-photon entangled state of the form
|φn〉ab =
1
n!
√
n+ 1
(a†hb
†
v − a†vb†h)n|0〉ab. (2)
In Eq. (2), |0〉ab is the vacuum state and a†h and a†v (b†h
and b†v) denote, respectively, the creation operators of
horizontally and vertically polarized photons at the spa-
tial mode a (b).
The case p1 = 1 (and, thus, pn = 0 ∀n 6= 1) in Eq. (1)
corresponds to an ideal entanglement source generating
singlet states, while the distribution
pn =
(n+ 1)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
, (3)
corresponds to a type-II parametric down-conversion
(PDC) source [39, 40]. The parameter λ in Eq. (3) is one
half of the expected number of photon pairs generated by
the source each given time, i.e., λ = 12
∑∞
n=0 pnn.
The second type of light source that we will consider
emits states of the form
|Ψ〉ab =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|n, n〉ab, (4)
where the 2n-photon state |n, n〉ab = (a†b†)n/n!|0〉ab,
a† (b†) being the creation operator in the idler (signal)
mode. As an example, a triggered PDC source can gener-
ate states like Eq. (4) with pn = µ
n(1 + µ)−n−1, µ being
the mean number of photon pairs per pulse [41, 42].
This latter source can be used, for instance, to simulate
practical single-photon sources. For example, upon the
successful detection of one photon in the idler mode a of
|Ψ〉ab, the normalized quantum state in the signal mode
can be written as
ρsingle =
∞∑
n=0
rn|n〉b〈n|, (5)
for a certain probability distribution, rn, which depends
on the characteristics of the photodetector used to mea-
sure the idler mode. See Appendix A 2 a for the value of
rn in the case of triggered PDC sources.
B. Photodetectors
We shall consider that Alice and Bob have at their dis-
posal photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors, which
are able to count the number of photons contained in
each incoming optical pulse. In the relevant regime of
low noise, they can be described by a positive operator
valued measure (POVM) with the following elements:
Πk =
{
(1− pd)Π˜0 if k = 0,
(1− pd)Π˜k + pdΠ˜k−1 if k ≥ 1, (6)
where the quantity pd stands for the dark count rate of
the photodetectors, which is, to a good approximation,
independent of the incoming signals. On the other hand,
the operators Π˜k that appear in Eq. (6), with k ∈ N, are
given by
Π˜k =
∞∑
j=k
(
j
k
)
ηkd(1− ηd)j−k|j〉〈j|, (7)
3with ηd denoting the detection efficiency of the detectors,
and where |j〉 stands for a Fock state with j photons.
We remark that the mathematical model given by
Eq. (6) assumes, for simplicity, that dark counts can only
increment by one unit the number of photons observed in
a given pulse. That is, if an optical pulse contains, say,
k photons, we assume that the measurement outcome is
at most k + 1 photons due to the dark counts, but not
greater than this. This is a fair approximation given that
pd is sufficiently low, which indeed is typically the case
in practice.
C. Heralded qubit amplifiers
As already discussed above, to achieve long-distance
DIQKD, we will consider that Alice and Bob use her-
alded qubit amplifiers [34–36] to notify them the arrival
of a photon before they select their measurement settings.
That is, only after the qubit amplifier confirms that a
photon has arrived, Alice (Bob) selects the measurement
and measures the photon. If no successful heralding takes
place, the optical pulse is simply discarded.
Typical qubit amplifiers consist in a teleportation
gate [43]. That is, a successful heralding occurs when
the state of the arriving photon is teleported to a pho-
ton at the output port of the qubit amplifier. The gen-
eral mechanism is depicted in Fig. 1(a), while Fig. 1(b)
shows the standard linear-optics Bell state measurement
(BSM) used by the qubit amplifiers introduced in [34–
36] to teleport the input photon. More efficient BSMs
exist [44, 45] and could be used here as well, although
they require complicated entangled ancilla states. De-
pending on the mechanism used to generate the bipartite
entangled states, ρbc, illustrated in Fig. 1(a), one can dis-
tinguish two types of qubit amplifiers: polarization qubit
amplifiers (PQAs) [34, 35] and entanglement swapping
relays (ESRs) [36].
PQAs, first introduced in [34] based on the seminal
work reported in [46], typically employ practical single-
photon sources to generate ρbc. For instance, the PQA
proposed in [35] uses the linear-optics circuit shown in
Fig. 1(c) for this purpose, where ρhsingle (ρ
v
single) repre-
sents the state of a single-photon pulse prepared in hori-
zontal (vertical) polarization. In the ideal case of perfect
single-photon sources and unit detection and coupling
efficiencies, it is straightforward to show that the circuit
given by Fig. 1(c) generates states ρbc = |φ〉bc〈φ| with
|φ〉bc = (1− t)|ψ〉bb + t|ϕ〉cc −
√
2t(1− t)|χ〉bc, (8)
where the parameter t is the transmittance of the tunable
beamsplitter (BS) illustrated in Fig. 1(c), and the states
BSM
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FIG. 1: (a) Working principle of an heralded qubit
amplifier based on teleportation [34–36]. A successful
heralding is indicated with a flag. It notifies that a
photon at the input port, a, of the qubit amplifier was
teleported to a photon at its output port, c. For this,
the qubit amplifier first generates a bipartite entangled
state, ρbc, and then measures the signals in modes a and
b with a Bell state measurement (BSM). In doing so,
the state of the photon at mode a is teleported to that
at mode c up to a unitary rotation. The main difference
between the qubit amplifiers proposed in [34–36] is the
mechanism to generate the entangled states ρbc. See the
main text for further details. (b) Linear-optics BSM.
The input states in modes a and b interfere at a 50:50
beamsplitter (BS). A polarizing BS (PBS) located at
each output port of the BS separates vertically and
horizontally polarized photons. Here we shall assume
that all detectors are PNR detectors. A successful BSM
corresponds to detecting two photons with orthogonal
polarizations, i.e., only when exactly two detectors
detect one input photon each for any of the following
photodetector pairs: (Dh, Dv), (Dh, D˜v), (D˜h, Dv) or
(D˜h, D˜v). (c) Scheme introduced in [35] to generate ρbc.
A light source emits horizontally (vertically) polarized
single-photons ρhsingle (ρ
v
single), which interfere at a PBS
and then go through a BS of tunable transmittance t.
Two Hadamard gates, denoted by H in the figure, are
used to avoid (if one disregards noise effects) that input
vacuum signals at mode a can produce a successful
heralding flag when the BSM is that given by Fig. 1(b).
4|ψ〉bb, |ϕ〉cc, and |χ〉bc have the form
|ψ〉bb =
1
2
(b†h
2 − b†v
2
)|0〉b,
|ϕ〉cc =
1
2
(c†h
2 − c†v
2
)|0〉c,
|χ〉bc =
1√
2
(b†hc
†
h − b†vc†v)|0〉bc. (9)
In Eq. (9), the states |0〉b, |0〉c and |0〉bc denote the vac-
uum states of the corresponding modes. The expression
for the output states of the PQA in the practical sce-
nario with non-ideal sources and non-unit detector and
coupling efficiencies can be found in Appendix A 2.
Let us continue assuming, for simplicity and for the
moment, an ideal scenario where the BSM within the
qubit amplifier uses perfect PNR detectors (i.e., pd = 0
and ηd = 1 in Eqs. (6)-(7)) and lossless BSs and PBSs.
Then, from Eq. (8), it can be shown that whenever
a single-photon pulse prepared in, say, the pure state
|ϕin〉a = (αa†h +βa†v)|0〉a (with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1) arrives at
the input port a of the qubit amplifier, a successful BSM
occurs with probability t(1 − t). Also, in the case of a
successful result, the state of the output photon at mode
c (after applying an appropriate unitary transformation)
is equal to |ϕout〉c = (αc†h + βc†v)|0〉c. That is, the state|ϕin〉a of the input photon is successfully teleported to an
output photon. On the other hand, if a vacuum pulse,
|ϕin〉a = |0〉a, arrives at the input port a of the qubit am-
plifier, this state can never lead to a spurious heralding
event, at least in the ideal scenario. This is so because,
when the BSM uses perfect PNR detectors with no dark
counts, the state |0〉a|φ〉bc, with |φ〉bc given by Eq. (8),
cannot produce two detection clicks associated to orthog-
onal polarizations if it is measured with the BSM shown
in Fig. 1(b).
Finally, qubit amplifiers based on ESRs [36] directly
prepare the state ρbc with practical entanglement light
sources like, for example, PDC sources. Indeed, in con-
trast to the arguments presented in [34, 47], it was shown
in [36] that when this type of qubit amplifier is used in
DIQKD it can provide higher secret key rates than those
achievable with the PQA introduced in [34] when using
PDC sources.
D. Optical couplers
In our analysis in Sec. V, we will consider a fiber-based
implementation of DIQKD. Thus, we will model the cou-
pling of the photons generated by the light sources into
the optical fibers by means of a BS of transmittance ηc.
One input to the BS is the quantum signal, while the
other input is a vacuum state. Similarly, one of the out-
puts of the BS is the optical fiber, while we assume that
the other output is not accessible and represents the loss.
For further details about this model we refer the reader
to Appendix A.
E. Quantum channel
For simplicity, we will suppose that the quantum chan-
nel mainly introduces loss. That is, we shall disregard
any noise effect due for example to polarization or phase
misalignment.
The channel loss is modeled with a BS of transmittance
ηch = 10
−Λ/10, where the parameter Λ (dB) is related
to the transmission distance L (km) by an attenuation
coefficient α (dB/km) via the expression Λ = αL. The
specific value of α depends on the considered channel.
For instance, a typical value for α in the case of single-
mode optical fibers in the telecom wavelength is α = 0.2
dB/km.
III. DIQKD PROTOCOL
We consider the DIQKD protocol introduced in [28].
It is based on a CHSH test [24], and is equivalent to
a certain two-party nonlocal game known as the CHSH
game.
Before presenting the steps of the protocol in detail,
we introduce some notation first. Alice’s measurement
setting in the i-th successfully heralded round of the
protocol is denoted by Xi ∈ {0, 1}, where Xi = 0 and
Xi = 1 tag the measurements described by the two fol-
lowing Pauli operators
σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
and σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (10)
respectively. On the other hand, Bob’s measurement set-
ting in the i-th successfully heralded round of the proto-
col is denoted by Yi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where Yi = 0 tags the
measurement σ+ = (σz + σx)/
√
2, Yi = 1 indicates the
measurement σ− = (σz−σx)/
√
2 and Yi = 2 refers to the
measurement σz, with σz and σx again given by Eq. (10).
Similarly, Alice’s (Bob’s) outcome in the i-th successfully
heralded round is denoted by Ai ∈ {0, 1} (Bi ∈ {0, 1}).
Next, we present the different steps of the protocol.
A schematic is shown in Fig. 4. For simplicity and for
the moment, we shall assume that only Bob holds a
qubit amplifier to compensate channel loss, while Alice
has the entanglement source, ρab, in her lab. The case
where both Alice and Bob hold a qubit amplifier and
the entanglement source is located in the middle of the
channel between them is analyzed in Appendix A 4.
Protocol steps
1. Initialization. Bob sets the counter i of successfully
heralded rounds to 0.
While i < nSH for a certain prefixed value nSH, steps
2 and 3 below are repeated.
2. Distribution. Alice prepares a bipartite entangled
state, ρab, and sends system b to Bob through the
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FIG. 2: Schematic of the considered DIQKD protocol.
Alice holds an entanglement source, ρab, in her lab, and
Bob holds a qubit amplifier to mitigate the effect of
channel loss. In every round of the protocol in which a
successful heralding takes place at Bob’s qubit
amplifier, he randomly chooses a bit value Ti ∈ {0, 1}.
If Ti = 0, Alice (Bob) chooses as measurement setting
Xi = σz (Yi = σz). If Ti = 1, Alice chooses at random
her measurement setting Xi ∈ {σz, σx}, with σz and σx
being the Pauli matrices given by Eq. (10). Similarly, in
this latter case, Bob chooses at random his
measurement setting Yi ∈ {σ+, σ−}, where
σ± = (σz ± σx)/
√
2. Their respective outcomes are
recorded as Ai, Bi ∈ {0, 1}, where Ai (Bi) indicates
which of Alice’s (Bob’s) two photodetectors registered a
single-photon pulse. If, say, Alice obtains an
inconclusive result (i.e., no photons or multiple photons
are observed), she deterministically selects Ai = 1, and
similarly for Bob. The reader is referred to the main
text for further details.
quantum channel. If no successful heralding takes
place at Bob’s qubit amplifier, the signal is discarded
and step 2 is repeated. Otherwise, Bob updates the
counter i to i + 1. Then, he randomly chooses a bit
value Ti ∈ {0, 1} with probabilities P(Ti = 0) = 1 − γ
and P(Ti = 1) = γ, respectively, and sends it to Alice
through an authenticated classical channel. We denote
by T = (T1, T2, ..., TnSH) the string of all bit values Ti.
3. Measurement. If Ti = 0, the i-th successfully her-
alded round is considered to be a key generation round,
and Alice and Bob choose the settings (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2).
If Ti = 1, such round is considered to be a test round
(i.e., a CHSH game round), and they independently se-
lect Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
Alice and Bob record their measurement outcomes
as Ai, Bi ∈ {0, 1}, respectively. If, say, Alice (Bob)
obtains an inconclusive result (i.e., no photon or mul-
tiple photons are observed in the detectors) she (he)
deterministically assigns Ai = 1 (Bi = 1) to keep the
fair-sampling loophole closed. Finally, Alice (Bob)
publicly announces the measurement settings Xi (Yi).
In what follows, we will denote by X (Y ) the bit string
X1, X2, ..., XnSH (Y1, Y2, ..., YnSH) of Alice’s (Bob’s) mea-
surement settings for the successfully heralded rounds.
Similarly, A (B) will denote the string of measurement
outcomes A1, A2, ..., AnSH (B1, B2, ..., BnSH).
4. Information reconciliation. Alice and Bob use an
error correction protocol to obtain from A and B two
Protocol arguments
nSH Post-processing block size
γ Probability of a test round
δest Confidence interval for the CHSH game winning rate
IR Error probability of information reconciliation
PA Error probability of privacy amplification
l Length of the final keys KA and KB
TABLE I: List containing the main protocol arguments.
identical bit strings, ZA and ZB, respectively. For this,
Alice sends Bob leakIR bits of syndrome information
and Bob obtains an estimate, ZB, of A. Next, they
perform an error verification step (using two-universal
hash functions) that leaks at most dlog2 1/IRe bits of
information to Eve, for a certain prefixed parameter
IR. If this last step is successful, it is guaranteed that
Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings ZA = A and ZB satisfy
P(ZA 6= ZB) ≤ IR. Otherwise, the protocol aborts.
5. Parameter estimation. Bob sets the parameter Ci =⊥
for the key generation rounds (i.e., when Ti = 0) and
Ci = ωCHSH(ZBi, Bi, Xi, Yi) for the test rounds (i.e.,
when Ti = 1), with i = 1, 2, ..., nSH, and where ZBi de-
notes the i-th bit of the string ZB and the function ωCHSH
is defined as
ωCHSH(a, b, x, y) =
{
1 if a⊕ b = x · y ,
0 otherwise,
with ⊕ denoting bit addition modulo 2 and · denoting
bit multiplication. The overall number of test rounds
in which Ci = 1 (and thus the parties win the CHSH
game) is denoted by CSH =
∑
{i:Ti=1} Ci. This quantity
determines a lower bound on the number of secret bits
that can be extracted from ZA and ZB using privacy
amplification [28].
Bob aborts the protocol if the fraction of wins lies
below a certain prefixed threshold value, i.e., when
CSH/nSH < ω|SHγ − δest, where ω|SH is the expected
winning rate of the CHSH game in the test rounds for the
considered channel model [48], γ is again the probability
that Bob uses a successfully heralded round as a test
round, and δest is the confidence interval that defines
the abortion threshold. That is, δest is the maximum
difference between the expected and the actual winning
rates of the CHSH game that Bob accepts without
aborting.
6. Privacy amplification. Alice and Bob apply a privacy
amplification protocol to their bit strings ZA and ZB
to obtain the final keys, KA and KB, of length l. This
protocol uses a randomness extractor that succeeds
except with error probability PA.
The main protocol arguments are summarized in Ta-
ble I.
We remark that in the distribution step of the protocol,
Alice and Bob need to store their signals until they choose
6their measurement settings and measure the signals in
the third step of the protocol. For simplicity, below we
will optimistically assume that, for this purpose, both of
them hold noiseless and lossless quantum memories in
their labs. Alternatively, they could also decide which
rounds are key generation rounds and which ones are
test rounds a posteriori by using the typical sifting step
in QKD, though this approach results in a slightly less
efficient solution. This is so because the data associated
to Alice measuring σx and Bob measuring σz is not used
in the protocol.
Also, we note that in a photonic implementation of the
DIQKD scheme, the measurements Xi and Yi can be re-
alized by means of a polarization modulator that rotates
the polarization state of the incoming signals, together
with a PBS that separates vertical and horizontal polar-
ization modes, followed by two photodetectors. For ex-
ample, the rotation angles of the polarization modulator
associated to the measurements σz, σx, σ+ and σ− are
0, pi/4, pi/8 and −pi/8 radians, respectively. The obser-
vation of one single-photon in, say, horizontal (vertical)
polarization is recorded by Alice as Ai = 0 (Ai = 1), and
the same applies to Bob.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We use the security analysis introduced in [28], which
is valid against coherent attacks. Prior to the execution
of the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on three parameters
that tag the security of the final keys, KA and KB. These
parameters are the secrecy parameter, sec, the correct-
ness parameter, cor, and the robustness parameter, rob.
In particular, a protocol is said to be sec-secret, when
implemented using a device D, if it satisfies
[1− P(abort)]||ρKAE − ρUl ⊗ ρE||1 ≤ sec, (11)
where P(abort) is the abortion probability of the pro-
tocol, ||ρ||1 =
√
ρρ† stands for the trace norm, E is a
quantum register held by the eavesdropper that may be
initially correlated with D, ρKAE is the output state of
the DIQKD protocol describing Alice’s key string KA
and the quantum register E conditioned on not aborting,
ρUl =
∑
z
1
2l
|z〉A〈z| is the uniform mixture of all possible
values of a l-bit string KA, and ρUl ⊗ ρE is the perfectly
secret output state.
The parameter sec is upper bounded by
sec ≤ PA + s + EA, (12)
where PA+s is the total failure probability associated to
the privacy amplification step, PA being an upper bound
on the error probability of the randomness extractor and
s being the smoothing parameter of the s-smooth min-
entropy [28]. The term EA is the failure probability asso-
ciated to the entropy accumulation theorem [30], which
only guarantees that a certain lower bound on the s-
smooth min-entropy holds with a probability larger than
1− EA.
Finite-key security parameters
sec Secrecy parameter
cor Correctness parameter
rob Robustness parameter
s Smoothing parameter of the min-entropy
PErob Abort probability of parameter estimation
IRrob Abort probability of information reconciliation
EArob Abort probability of entropy accumulation
EA Error probability of entropy accumulation bound
TABLE II: List containing the main finite-key security
parameters.
The correctness parameter, cor, quantifies the prob-
ability that the final keys, KA and KB, are not equal.
More precisely, a protocol is said to be cor-correct if
P[KA 6= KB] ≤ cor. According to the protocol definition
given in the previous section, we have that cor = IR.
Finally, a protocol is said to be rob-robust for a specific
honest implementation (i.e., for a particular implemen-
tation where the eavesdropper does not intervene) if it
aborts with a probability smaller than rob. The pro-
tocol described above can only abort in two steps: the
information reconciliation step, and the parameter esti-
mation step. Therefore, we have that rob satisfies
rob ≤ IRrob + PErob, (13)
where IRrob (
PE
rob) is the probability of aborting at the
information reconciliation (parameter estimation) step
for the considered honest implementation. Moreover, we
have that the quantity PErob verifies
PErob ≤ EArob + IR, (14)
where EArob is the probability of the fraction of CHSH
wins, CSH/nSH, being lower than the threshold ω|SHγ −
δest. That is,
EArob = P
(
ω|SHγ − CSH
nSH
> δest
)
. (15)
Note that for fixed values of EArob and nSH, the minimum
value of δest, such that Eq. (15) holds, satisfies [49]
δest ≥
√
1
2nSH
ln
1
EArob
. (16)
Also, we note that the parameter IR contributes to 
PE
rob
in Eq. (14) because, conditioned on not aborting the pro-
tocol in the error verification step, Bob performs the pa-
rameter estimation step by using his original bit string
of outcomes, B, and his estimate, ZB, of Alice’s string,
which is equal to ZA except with probability IR.
A list with the main parameters related to the security
of the protocol is provided in Table II.
Then, it turns out that, conditioned on not aborting,
the DIQKD protocol presented in the previous section
7delivers cor-correct and sec-secret output keys, KA and
KB, whose length, l, is given by
l = nSH(ηopt − γ)− 2log 7
√
1− 2 log
[s
4
(EA + IR)
]
× √nSH − leakIR − 3 log
[
1−
√
1−
(s
4
)2]
− 2 log 1
PA
. (17)
Here, the term ηopt represents a lower bound on the en-
tropy generation rate of the CHSH game (see Appendix B
for further details on ηopt and leakIR). Importantly, the
conditional secret key rate, i.e., the number of secret key
bits per successful heralding event, reads K|SH = l/nSH,
and the secret key rate is defined as
K =
l
N
, (18)
where N is the total number of transmitted signals. Be-
low, we will use the term “success rate” to refer to the
number of successful heralding events per transmitted
signal, i.e., rSH = nSH/N .
We remark that, in the limit where nSH →∞, Eq. (18)
matches the asymptotic secret key rate against gen-
eral attacks reported in [17], which we will denote by
K∞. To see this, note that the quantum communica-
tion phase of the protocol described in the previous sec-
tion only ends when nSH heralded events are observed.
This means that the number of transmitted signals, N ,
is a negative binomial random variable. Let Var (N/nSH)
be the variance of the related random variable
N/nSH. Then, we have that limnSH→∞Var (N/nSH) =
limnSH→∞ (1− PSH)/(nSHPSH2) = 0. This means that
limnSH→∞N/nSH = 1/PSH, where PSH is the successful
heralding probability of the qubit amplifier. By using this
result, it is straightforward to show that K∞ satisfies
K∞ = lim
nSH→∞
nSHηopt − leakIR
N
= PSH
{
1− h
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω|SH(ω|SH − 1) + 3
]
− h(Q|SH)
}
, (19)
which is the result provided in [17]. In this equation,
h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary en-
tropy function, and Q|SH represents the quantum bit er-
ror rate of the key generation rounds. In the asymp-
totic regime, the conditional secret key rate reduces to
K|SH = K∞/PSH, while for the success rate we have
rSH = PSH.
In the next section, we evaluate the effect that device
imperfections—particularly, finite detection and coupling
efficiencies and the multi-photon pulses emitted by prac-
tical sources—have on the performance of DIQKD in
terms of the resulting secret key rate for various honest
optical implementations.
sec cor rob
S1 10
−5 10−10 10−2
S2 10
−9 10−15 10−3
TABLE III: Sets of security parameters sec, cor and
rob considered in the performance evaluation of
DIQKD. The set S1 provides a lower level of security
than the set S2.
V. EVALUATION
Here, we use the device models introduced in Sec. II
to evaluate the performance of the DIQKD protocol pre-
sented in Sec. III, by using the security analysis given
in the previous section. The goal is to determine the re-
sources needed to implement DIQKD over long distances.
All the relevant calculations to reproduce the results pre-
sented in this section are included in Appendix A.
For simplicity, in the simulations below we assume that
the coupling efficiency of the light sources is equal to
the detection efficiency of the photodetectors, i.e., we
set ηc = ηd = ηc,d. This decision is motivated because
DIQKD requires very high values of ηc,d, so the effect of
this simplification is negligible, and it reduces the num-
ber of experimental parameters to consider. Also, unless
otherwise stated, we fix the dark count rate of the pho-
todetectors to pd = 10
−7, which is a reasonable value
with current technology [50, 51].
Furthermore, for illustration purposes, we consider
two examples of security parameter sets (sec, cor, rob),
which we denote by S1 and S2. These sets are given
in Table III. Also, to simplify the numerics, we fix the
value of the failure probability of the entropy accumula-
tion theorem to EA = 10
−6 (EA = 10−10) for the set S1
(S2). We remark, however, that according to our simu-
lations the loss of generality that results from fixing the
value of EA in advance is very small. The secret key rate
is then maximized over the remaining parameters, which
include the quantities PA, s, 
IR
rob, 
EA
rob, the value of the
transmittance t in the case of a PQA (see Fig. 3(c)), as
well as the intensities of the different light sources.
In the absence of real experimental data, in our sim-
ulations we set the denominator of Eq. (18) to the ex-
pected number of transmitted signals until nSH successful
heralding detection events occur at the qubit amplifier,
which is given by
〈N〉 = nSH
PSH
. (20)
This also amounts to setting the success rate of the qubit
amplifier to its expected value, i.e., 〈rSH〉 = PSH.
Finally, in all the plots below we assume a threshold
value for the secret key rate as low as 10−10. That is,
whenever the resulting secret key rate is smaller than
this threshold value, it is considered to be impractical
and we neglect it, as this value is already probably too
low to have any practical relevance.
8A. Ideal sources
We start by analyzing the ideal scenario where Alice
and Bob hold perfect photon sources. Obviously, this
case provides the best possible performance, and thus it
can be used as a reference about the minimum resources
(say, e.g., the minimum value of the detection and cou-
pling efficiency, ηc,d, and the minimum block size, nSH)
that are required to achieve a certain secret key rate.
More precisely, we consider here that the entangle-
ment source, ρab, at Alice’s lab generates perfect po-
larization Bell pairs, i.e., ρab = |φ1〉ab〈φ1| with |φ1〉ab
given by Eq. (2). Also, in the case of a PQA, we set
ρhsingle (ρ
v
single) to be a perfect single-photon source gen-
erating horizontally (vertically) polarized single photons.
That is, ρhsingle = |1, 0〉〈1, 0| (ρvsingle = |0, 1〉〈0, 1|) with
|1, 0〉 = a†h|0〉 (|0, 1〉 = a†v|0〉), being |0〉 the vacuum state.
Similarly, in the case of an ESR, we set ρbc = |φ1〉bc〈φ1|.
1. No channel loss
To begin with, we compare the achievable performance
when using PQAs and ESRs in the absence of channel
loss, i.e., we set the distance at L = 0 km. This scenario
allows us to determine the minimum value of nSH as a
function of ηc,d.
As we will show below, it turns out that ηc,d is quite
high even in this ideal scenario. This means that the
probability that any of these two amplifiers provides a
spurious success at Bob’s side due to the dark counts
of the PNR detectors within the BSM is negligible com-
pared to that of a genuine success triggered by a single
photon from Alice. Therefore, for simplicity, in this sub-
section we set the dark count rate pd equal to zero. With
this approximation, it is straightforward to derive simple
analytical expressions for the quantities PSH, ω|SH and
Q|SH. In the case of an ESR, we obtain
PESRSH =
ξ2
2
,
ω|ESRSH =
2 +
√
2
4
ξ2 +
3
4
(1− ξ)2 + ξ(1− ξ),
Q|ESRSH = ξ(1− ξ), (21)
where the parameter ξ = η2c,d. Similarly, it can be shown
that in the case of a PQA we have
PPQASH = (1− t)ξ2 [1− ξ(1− t)] ,
ω|PQASH =
1
1− ξ(1− t)
[
2 +
√
2
4
tξ2 +
3
4
(1− ξ)2
+
(1 + t)
2
ξ(1− ξ)
]
,
Q|PQASH =
(1 + t)ξ(1− ξ)
2 [1− ξ(1− t)] , (22)
where the parameter t corresponds to the transmittance
of the BS within the amplifier. See Appendix A for de-
tails of the calculations to derive Eqs. (21) and (22).
From Eq. (22), it is evident that there is a trade-off
on the coefficient t. The terms ω|PQASH and Q|PQASH favor
t ≈ 1, and thus the conditional secret key rate K|SH,
which depends on these parameters but not on PPQASH ,
also favors t ≈ 1. Indeed, in the limit t→ 1 we have that
ω|PQASH = ω|ESRSH and Q|PQASH = Q|ESRSH . On the other hand,
the average success rate of the qubit amplifier, PPQASH , is
maximized when t = 1− (2ξ)−1, and it actually vanishes
when t = 1. This behaviour can be easily understood by
examining the states ρbc = |φ〉bc〈φ| generated within the
PQA and which are given by Eq. (8). By setting t close
to 1 we have that whenever a successful heralding takes
place at the qubit amplifier, with a high probability this
event is due to the entangled pair |χ〉bc (see Eq. (9)), and
thus K|SH is maximized. On the contrary, the lower the
transmittance t is, the more likely is that a successful
heralding comes from the spurious term |ψ〉bb and, con-
sequently, K|SH is minimized. This might happen when
only one photon from |ψ〉bb is detected due to the finite
detection efficiency of the detectors, and the remaining
necessary detection is caused by a single photon coming
from Alice. In our simulations, we numerically optimize
the value of t so that the overall secret key rate K is
maximized.
Also, we remark that from Eqs. (19)-(21)-(22) it is easy
to show that a positive secret key rate requires a very
high value of ξ ' 92.3% (or, equivalently, ηc,d =
√
ξ '
96.1%) for both types of qubit amplifiers. Similarly,
from Eqs. (21) and (22), it can be shown that, irrespec-
tively of the value of t, whenever ξ ≥ 50% we have that
PESRSH > P
PQA
SH , ω|ESRSH ≥ ω|PQASH and Q|ESRSH ≤ Q|PQASH .
That is, an ESR-based qubit amplifier always outper-
forms a PQA in the absence of channel loss, if perfect
sources are assumed.
In Fig. 3(a) we plot the minimum block size, nSH, and
the minimum detection efficiency, ηc,d, that are needed
to obtain a secret key rate above the threshold value of
10−10 at L = 0 km. We denote this secret key rate
by K|L=0, and the minimum block size is denoted by
n∗SH|L=0. The value of n∗SH|L=0 is obtained for each value
of ηc,d via exhaustive numerical search over all the free
parameters contained in the finite-key rate formula given
by Eq. (18). The solid (dashed) bluish (reddish) lines
correspond to the ESR (PQA) architecture, and in each
case the lower (upper) line uses the set of security re-
quirements S1 (S2); see Table III. Remarkably, despite
the security parameters of S2 being significantly more
demanding than those of S1, it turns out that the set S2
does not require much larger block sizes than S1.
Also, Fig. 3(a) indicates that both qubit amplifiers re-
quire a similar minimum block size, n∗SH|L=0, to deliver
a secret key rate above the threshold value. Indeed, it
is easy to show that if the threshold value for the secret
key rate were zero (instead of 10−10) then the value of
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FIG. 3: Performance evaluation of DIQKD with ideal
photon sources at L = 0 km. Bluish (reddish) lines are
used for the ESR (PQA) architecture. (a) Minimum
value of the detection and coupling efficiency, ηc,d, and
minimum value of the block size, nSH, required to
obtain a zero-distance secret key rate K|L=0 ≥ 10−10.
Both sets of security requirements, S1 and S2, are
compared for each qubit amplifier. Any combination of
parameters ηc,d and nSH must be above the lower
(upper) lines to achieve a secret key rate above the
threshold value with the security requirements given by
the sets S1 (S2). The dotted black vertical line indicates
the (asymptotic) minimum efficiency, ηc,d ≈ 96.1%,
which is the smallest detection efficiency that delivers a
zero-distance asymptotic secret key rate
K∞|L=0 ≥ 10−10. (b) Zero-distance secret key rate,
K|L=0, as a function of ηc,d for various values of the
block size nSH. For each qubit amplifier, four different
block sizes are considered: nSH →∞, nSH = 1011,
nSH = 10
9 and nSH = 10
7. The finite secret key rates
appear in pairs of solid lines, one for the security set S1
(upper line) and another one for the security set S2
(lower line). The asymptotic secret key rates
corresponding to nSH →∞ are illustrated with dotted
lines.
n∗SH|L=0 would be equal for both qubit amplifiers. How-
ever, since we use a threshold value greater than zero
implies that n∗SH|L=0 is always slightly lower for the ESR
than for the PQA. This is so because, even though the
latter can mimic the conditional secret key rate of the
former for any efficiency ηc,d, the ESR has a higher suc-
cess probability PESRSH , thus leading to a higher overall
secret key rate. Nevertheless, this effect cannot be fully
appreciated with the resolution of Fig. 3(a).
Finally, the dotted black vertical line illustrated in
Fig. 3(a) corresponds to the (asymptotic) minimum ef-
ficiency, ηc,d ≈ 96.1%, required to obtain K∞|L=0 ≥
10−10. That is, no secret key rate above such thresh-
old value is possible when ηc,d / 96.1%, no matter how
much we increase the block size.
In what follows, we will refer to the lines in Fig. 3(a) as
the critical lines, since every pair (ηc,d, nSH) lying below
these lines delivers a negligible secret key rate with the
corresponding security requirements.
Fig. 3(b) shows the zero-distance secret key rate,
K|L=0, as a function of the detection and coupling ef-
ficiency, ηc,d, for different values of the block size, nSH.
As already discussed above, the ESR architecture always
leads to larger secret key rates for all values of ηc,d, while
the minimum efficiencies required to have a secret key
rate larger than the threshold value are roughly equal
for both qubit amplifiers. Again, the small mismatch be-
tween the minimum efficiencies required by both ampli-
fiers occurs because the selected threshold is greater than
zero. Otherwise, the minimum efficiencies would match.
For illustrative purposes, Fig. 3(b) considers four differ-
ent block sizes: nSH → ∞, nSH = 1011, nSH = 109 and
nSH = 10
7. As already shown in Fig. 3(a), the smaller
the block size is, the larger the value of the minimum
efficiency ηc,d that is required. For instance, for a block
size as large as, say, nSH = 10
11, and if one considers
the weaker set of security requirements S1, the minimum
efficiency is at least ηc,d ≈ 96.4%. Also, for any given
value of nSH, the greater the detection efficiency consid-
ered (with respect to its minimum value), the closer the
resulting secret key rates corresponding to the security
settings S1 and S2 become. This is so because, in this
situation, the effect of finite statistics is less prominent.
Note that in the limit given by the asymptotic regime,
the secret key rate K∞ does not depend on the security
sets S1 and S2, but these sets are only relevant in the
finite-key regime.
2. Channel loss
In this subsection, we consider the effect of channel
loss, which is parametrized by the quantity Λ = αL mea-
sured in dB (see Sec. II E). Also, we set here the dark
count rate of the detectors to pd = 10
−7, as the effect of
dark counts becomes relevant in this scenario.
Fig. 4 plots the secret key rate K as a function of Λ for
various values of ηc,d and nSH, and for the two considered
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FIG. 4: Secret key rate K as a function of the overall
channel loss Λ = 10 log10 (1/ηch) measured in dB for the
case of ideal photon sources. Figure (a) corresponds to
the ESR architecture and figure (b) to the PQA
architecture. In both figures, we use two different
detection and coupling efficiencies, ηc,d = 100% and
ηc,d = 96.5%, each of them tagged with a different color.
For each value of the efficiency, we plot the asymptotic
secret key rate K∞ (dotted line), together with two
finite-key rates for different values of nSH (solid lines).
Each finite-key rate is plotted twice, one line
corresponds to the security settings S1 and the other
line to the security settings S2. Both finite-key rates
assume a common block size nSH close to the critical
one (see Fig. 3(a)). More precisely, we take nSH = 10
7
when ηc,d = 100% and nSH = 10
11 when ηc,d = 96.5%.
By increasing the value of ηc,d and/or nSH the finite-key
rates approach those of the optimal scenario, which
corresponds to K∞ assuming ηc,d = 100%.
qubit amplifier architectures. More precisely, we use two
values for ηc,d: the ideal one, i.e., ηc,d = 100%, and one
close to the threshold value of 96.1% discussed above,
say, ηc,d = 96.5%. Moreover, for each of these values of
the efficiency ηc,d, we plot three different secret key rates:
the asymptotic one K∞, and two finite-key rates, one for
the security settings S1 and another one for the secu-
rity settings S2. In both finite-key cases, we use a com-
mon block size nSH close to the critical value obtained
from Fig. 3.(a). Specifically, we set nSH = 10
7 when
ηc,d = 100%, and nSH = 10
11 when ηc,d = 96.5%. In
doing so, and for the considered security analysis, we are
simultaneously providing upper bounds (given by K∞)
and lower bounds (given by the finite-key rates) to the
finite-key performance that could be achieved with the
chosen detection and coupling efficiencies, and the secu-
rity requirements. By increasing the value of nSH, the
finite-key rates approach the asymptotic scenario. Also,
K∞ with ηc,d = 100% provides a clear upper bound for
the achievable secret key rate with the security analysis
introduced in Sec. IV.
Figs. 4.(a) and (b) further show, as expected, that in
the case of ideal sources the ESR architecture outper-
forms the PQA architecture also in the presence of chan-
nel loss.
As a final remark, we note that if Bob did not use a
qubit amplifier, then the maximum possible value of Λ
would be very limited. Indeed, it can be shown that in
the case of ideal sources, and even if one sets ηc,d = 100%
and nSH → ∞, the maximum value of Λ is as low as
Λ / 0.7 dB. See Appendix A 3 for further details.
3. Time constraints
In the discussion so far, we have not considered the
duration of a DIQKD session, which is another crucial
experimental parameter. Indeed, this parameter imposes
strong restrictions on the loss that DIQKD can tolerate.
We study it in this section.
In the protocol described in Sec. III, we have that the
post-processing block size, nSH, is fixed a priori. This
means, in particular, that the number of transmitted sig-
nals, N , which is needed to achieve nSH successful herald-
ing events, and thus the duration of the distribution step
of the protocol, which we shall denote by τ , are random
variables. Their mean values are given by Eq. (20) and
〈τ〉 = ν 〈N〉, respectively, where ν represents the clock
rate of system.
From Eq. (20) we have that, for given nSH, the value of
〈N〉 increases when the success probability of the qubit
amplifier decreases, for instance, due to channel and/or
detection loss. Indeed, according to Eqs. (21)-(22) we
find that 〈N〉 at L = 0 km, which we will denote by
〈N〉 |L=0, is, in the case of an ESR, equal to
〈N〉 |L=0 = 2nSH
η2c,d
, (23)
while in the case of a PQA it satisfies
〈N〉 |L=0 = nSH
(1− t)η4c,d[1− η2c,d(1− t)]
≈ nSH
(1− t)η4c,d
. (24)
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FIG. 5: Average number of signals, 〈N〉 |L=0, that Alice
needs to send Bob to collect a data block size equal to
nSH when using ideal photon sources, as a function of
the detection and coupling efficiency ηc,d at L = 0 km.
As in Eqs. (21)-(22), in this figure we disregard dark
counts because their effect at L = 0 km is negligible.
Also, we set the free experimental and security
parameters to those values that optimize the secret key
rate given by Fig. 3(b). The figure considers three
different data block sizes, i.e., nSH = 10
7, nSH = 10
9
and nSH = 10
11. All the plots are cut at the value of
ηc,d for which the resulting secret key rate is below the
threshold value of 10−10. We note that, since in the
case of the ESR the value of 〈N〉 |L=0 does not depend
on any parameter to be optimized, the cases S1 and S2
only differ in the minimum ηc,d that still provides
K ≥ 10−10, which can be extracted from Fig. 3. In the
case of the PQA, 〈N〉 |L=0 depends on the
transmittance t to be optimized, and therefore the cases
S1 and S2 differ more from each other.
This is illustrated in Fig. 5, which shows 〈N〉 |L=0 as
a function of ηc,d when nSH = {107, 109, 1011}. From
Fig. 5 we find that the value of 〈N〉 |L=0 associated to
the PQA presents a much steeper slope than that of the
ESR architecture when ηc,d decreases. This is because
the optimal transmittance t of the PQA approaches 1 in
that regime.
In the scenario where L > 0 km, the success probability
of the qubit amplifier decreases exponentially with the
channel loss. In particular, we find that the value of
〈N〉 |L≥0 in this case is given by
〈N〉 |L≥0 = 2nSH
η2c,d
{
(1− 4pd)ηchηc,d2
+ 4pd
[
1 + ηch(1− 2ηc,d2)
]}−1
, (25)
S1 ηc,d nSH Λcutoff Kcutoff 〈N〉
ESR 100% 107 48 dB 1.3× 10−7 1.2× 1012
ESR 96.5% 1011 39 dB 4.2× 10−8 1.8× 1015
PQA 100% 107 48 dB 6.3× 10−8 2.5× 1012
PQA 96.5% 1011 37 dB 2.7× 10−9 3.2× 1016
S2 ηc,d nSH Λcutoff Kcutoff 〈N〉
ESR 100% 107 44 dB 2.1× 10−7 5.0× 1011
ESR 96.5% 1011 35 dB 9.8× 10−8 7.2× 1014
PQA 100% 107 44 dB 1.0× 10−7 9.9× 1011
PQA 96.5% 1011 28 dB 2.4× 10−9 4.0× 1015
TABLE IV: Average number of signals, 〈N〉, that Alice
needs to send Bob to collect a data block size equal to
nSH, when using ideal photon sources. The dark count
rate of the photodetectors is set to pd = 10
−7, and the
detection and coupling efficiency is ηc,d. For each
combination (ηc,d, nSH), the considered value of Λ is
approximately equal to the cutoff loss for which the
secret key rate starts dropping down to zero in Fig. 4.
Also, the values of ηc,d and nSH correspond to the cases
illustrated in Fig. 4, and both sets of security settings,
S1 and S2, are considered.
for the ESR architecture, and
〈N〉 |L≥0 = nSH
η2c,d[1− η2c,d(1− t)]
{
(1− 10pd)(1− t)
× ηchη2c,d + 4pd(1− t+ ηch/2)
}−1
,
(26)
for the PQA. In these two equations, for simplicity, the
success probability PSH is computed to the first order in
pd. Table IV provides the value of 〈N〉 |L≥0 for a couple
of detection and coupling efficiencies ηc,d and data block
sizes nSH. This table shows that the average number of
signals that has to be transmitted increases significantly
with Λ, both for the ESR and the PQA.
Indeed, if one considers, for example, that the clock
rate of the system is, say, 10 GHz, we find that when
ηc,d = 96.5% it would take about 2.1 (37.0) days to estab-
lish a secret key of length 7.56×107 (8.64×107) bits—out
of a block size nSH = 10
11—over a channel loss of 39 dB
(37 dB) when using the ESR (PQA) architecture and the
security settings given by S1. Of course, the result im-
proves when ηc,d increases. For instance, if ηc,d = 100%
then it would take of the order of 120 (250) seconds to es-
tablish a secret key of length 1.56×105 (1.58×105)—out
of a block size nSH = 10
7—over 48 dB when using the
ESR (PQA) architecture and the security settings given
by S1.
B. PDC sources
In this subsection we consider now the more practical
case where Alice and Bob use PDC sources instead of
12
ideal sources.
That is, here we suppose that the quantum state, ρab,
emitted by Alice’s entanglement source in Fig. 2 is given
by Eq. (1) with the statistics pn given by Eq. (3). The
quantum state ρbc generated by the entanglement source
within the qubit amplifier depends on the architecture
considered. In the case of a PQA, we will assume that
the single-photon states, ρhsingle and ρ
v
single, have the form
given by Eq. (5) with the statistics rn given by Eq. (A33),
i.e., they are generated with a triggered single-photon
PDC source in combination with PNR detectors. In the
case of a ESR architecture, we will asume that the state
ρbc is directly generated with a PDC source, i.e., it has
the form given by Eq. (1) with pn given by Eq. (3).
To simplify the numerics, in our simulations below we
consider a contribution of up to three photon pairs per
source. That is, we set pn = 0 in Eq. (1) for all n ≥ 4
and we choose p3 = 1− p0− p1− p2. Likewise, we do the
same with the statistics rn in Eq. (5). This is a reasonable
approximation when the optimal intensities of the light
sources are sufficiently small, which, indeed, is what we
expect and observe in our simulations. A full mode anal-
ysis for this scenario is included in Appendix A, which in
principle could be use to evaluate the contribution of up
to any desired number of photon pairs per source.
1. No channel loss
Like in the case of ideal sources, we start our analysis
by evaluating the critical lines corresponding to the se-
curity setting sets S1 and S2 when the channel loss and
the dark count rate of the detectors is set to zero.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 6(a), which shows the
minimum data block size, n∗SH|L=0, and the minimum de-
tection and coupling efficiency, ηc,d, that are needed to
obtain K|L=0 ≥ 10−10. By definition, any combination
of ηc,d and nSH lying below the critical lines illustrated
in the figure leads to a minuscule (if not zero) secret
key rate below 10−10. The blue (red) solid lines corre-
spond to the ESR (PQA) architecture, and in each case
the lower (upper) line uses the security requirements S1
(S2). Fig. 6(a) shows clearly that the ESR architecture
demands much larger data block sizes and detection and
coupling efficiencies than the PQA architecture in this
case. This can be understood if one compares PSH and
K|SH separately for both qubit amplifiers: while the ESR
has a considerably larger success probability in the rel-
evant efficiency regime, its conditional secret key rate is
lower. This suggests that the PQA performs better at fil-
tering genuine entanglement, and thus it is more robust
to efficiency decrease and statistical fluctuations (partly
due to the availability of an extra tunable parameter t).
Also, as already observed in the case of ideal sources, we
note that using the security set S2 (instead of that given
by S1) does not affect much the minimum data block size,
despite the significant difference that exists between both
sets in terms of security requirements (see Table III).
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FIG. 6: Performance evaluation of DIQKD with PDC
sources. Bluish (reddish) lines are used for the ESR
(PQA) architecture. (a) Minimum value of the
detection and coupling efficiency, ηc,d, and minimum
value of the data block size, nSH, required to obtain a
zero-distance secret key rate K|L=0 ≥ 10−10. Both sets
of security requirements, S1 and S1, are compared for
each qubit amplifier. Any combination of parameters
ηc,d and nSH must be above the lower (upper) lines to
achieve a secret key rate above the threshold value with
the security requirements given by the sets S1 (S2).
The dotted blue (red) vertical line indicates the
(asymptotic) minimum efficiency, ηc,d ≈ 98.3%
(ηc,d ≈ 96.7%), which is the smallest detection efficiency
that delivers a zero-distance asymptotic secret key rate
K∞|L=0 ≥ 10−10 when using the ESR (PQA)
architecture. (b) Zero-distance secret key rate, K|L=0,
as a function of ηc,d for various values of the data block
size nSH. For each qubit amplifier, three different block
sizes are considered: nSH →∞, nSH = 1011 and
nSH = 10
9. The finite secret key rates appear in pairs of
solid lines, one for the security set S1 (upper line) and
another one for the security set S2 (lower line). The
asymptotic secret key rates corresponding to nSH →∞
are illustrated with dotted lines.
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The dotted blue (red) vertical line shown in Fig. 6(a)
corresponds to the (asymptotic) minimum efficiency,
ηc,d ≈ 98.3% (ηc,d ≈ 96.7%), that is necessary to ob-
tain a secret key rate above the threshold value with
the ESR-based qubit amplifier (PQA) when the block
size nSH tends to infinity. As expected, these values are
much higher than those required for the case of ideal
sources, specially for the ESR. These results are also in
accordance with the results reported in [36], as that work
also considers a similar setup and device models like here,
though the analysis of [36] is restricted to the asymptotic
key rate scenario. From Fig. 6(a) we observe that when
nSH decreases, the minimum value of ηc,d increases even
further as expected. For example, if nSH = 10
11 and we
focus on, say, the weaker set of security requirements, S1,
we find that the minimum values of ηc,d are about 98.6%
and 97% for the ESR and PQA, respectively.
Fig. 6(b) illustrates the zero-distance secret key rate,
K|L=0, as a function of ηc,d for varios values of the
block size nSH. This figure shows that, in the absence
of channel loss, an ESR-based qubit amplifier outper-
forms a PQA in the regime of very high detection and
coupling efficiencies, while in principle the PQA can tol-
erate slightly lower values of ηc,d, as we have already
seen in Fig. 6(a). In any case, the minimum value of
ηc,d, specially for the ESR, seems to be already proba-
bly too high to have practical relevance. The main rea-
sons for this behaviour are twofold. First, the vacuum
and multiple photon pairs emitted by the light sources
significantly reduce the probability to have a successful
heralding event in the amplifier. And, second, multiple
photon pairs are also responsable for spurious heralding
events which increase (decrease) Q|SH (ω|SH) and thus
decrease the resulting R. The higher ηc,d is, the higher is
the number of multiple photon pairs which can be filtered
out by Alice and Bob’s PNR detectors and, therefore, the
better the resulting performance. As already mentioned
above, in our simulations we optimize over the intensities
of the different light sources and, as expected, the opti-
mal intensities decrease when ηc,d decreases in order to
reduce the number of multiple photon pairs generated.
2. Channel loss
Next, we consider the effect of the channel loss and, as
in Sec. V A 2, we set pd = 10
−7.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 7, which shows the
secret key rate K as a function of Λ for various values
of ηc,d and nSH. More precisely, Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) are
respectively devoted to the ESR-architecture and to the
PQA-architecture. For each case, we assume two values
of ηc,d: the ideal one ηc,d = 100%, and another one close
to the threshold value of the ESR, say, ηc,d = 98.7%.
Regarding the block size nSH, we set it to a value near
the critical line in each case. That is, we consider the
pairs (ηc,d, nSH) ∈ {(100%, 109), (98.7%, 1011)} for the
ESR, and (ηc,d, nSH) ∈ {(100%, 107), (98.7%, 109)} for
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FIG. 7: Secret key rate K as a function of the overall
channel loss Λ measured in dB for the case of PDC
sources. Figure (a) corresponds to the ESR architecture
and figure (b) to the PQA architecture. For each qubit
amplifier, we use two different detection and coupling
efficiencies, ηc,d = 100% and ηc,d = 98.7%, each of them
tagged with a different color. For each value of the
efficiency, we plot the asymptotic secret key rate K∞
(dotted line), together with two finite-key rates for
different values of nSH (solid lines). Each finite-key rate
is plotted twice, one line corresponds to the security
settings S1 and the other line to the security settings
S2. We take nSH ∈ {109, 1011} for the ESR-based qubit
amplifier and nSH ∈ {107, 109} for the PQA. By
increasing the value of ηc,d and/or nSH the finite-key
rates approach those of the optimal scenario, which
corresponds to K∞ assuming ηc,d = 100%.
the PQA. Also, Fig. 7 includes the results for the sets S1
and S2 of security requirements, as well as the asymp-
totic curves corresponding to K∞. These latter curves
serve as upper bounds to the attainable finite-key rates
for each ηc,d.
Generally speaking, we observe that, in the presence
of channel loss, the performance of DIQKD with PDC
sources is again significantly worse than that achievable
with ideal sources. The reason for this, as already ex-
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plained above, is due to the presence of vacuum and mul-
tiple photon pairs, which require that the intensities of
the sources are quite low to palliate their negative effect.
Indeed, in the case of an ESR, we find that even when
nSH = 10
11, the detection and coupling efficiency is as
high as 98.7%, and the weaker set of security require-
ments is considered (S1), the resulting secret key rate is
already as low as K ≈ 10−10 for a channel loss of only
9 dB. Similarly, for the same value of ηc,d and a block size
nSH = 10
9, we find that the PQA can only tolerate about
14 dB channel loss. In this regard, we remark that setting
nSH to a different value for each qubit amplifier does not
necessarily lead to an unfair comparison between them,
as the average number of signals, 〈N〉, required to gather
a particular block size is different in both cases. This is
discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
Finally, from Fig. 7 we observe again that increasing
the security requirements from S1 to S2 does not affect
the system performance significantly. Also, we note that
if Bob did not use a qubit amplifier, the maximum possi-
ble value of Λ in this scenario would be as low as Λ / 0.4
dB, even if one sets ηc,d = 100% and nSH → ∞. See
Appendix A 3 for further details.
3. Time constraints
To conclude this part, we now consider the duration
of a DIQKD session with PDC sources. As we show be-
low, in this case the time requirements are much more
demanding than in the scenario with ideal sources. As
discussed above, this happens because the optimal inten-
sity of Alice’s source, ρab, is quite low in the high loss
regime. As a result, the average number, 〈N〉, of sig-
nals that Alice has to send Bob to achieve nSH successful
heralding events turns out to be quite high.
This is illustrated in Fig. 8, which shows the value of
〈N〉 as a function of ηc,d at L = 0 km. As in Fig. 5, dark
counts are disregarded here because their effect is negligi-
ble. Also, we consider both sets of security requirements
(S1 and S2) and two different block sizes for each qubit
amplifier: nSH = 10
11 and nSH = 10
9. We note that
the case 〈N〉 |L=0 ≥ 1015 leads to DIQKD sessions that
would take longer than one day even with 10 GHz PDC
sources. Actually, if the conditions 〈N〉 |L=0 < 1015 (see
Fig. 8) and K ≥ 10−10 (see Fig. 6) are imposed, one finds
that the detection efficiency must satisfy ηc,d ' 98%, ir-
respectively of the qubit amplifier and the data block
size. This means that the examples shown in Fig. 6 for
the PQA where K ≥ 10−10 is possible for ηc,d < 98%,
are probably not too practical, as they require too long
DIQKD sessions.
Obviously, if one considers the case of nonzero channel
loss, the time constraints become sharper. This is illus-
trated in Table V, which shows the maximum value of the
channel loss, Λ, for which 〈N〉 ≤ 1015 for various pairs
(ηc,d, nSH) previously evaluated in Fig. 7. For instance,
when ηc,d = 98.7%, and assuming the ESR (PQA) ar-
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FIG. 8: Average number of transmitted signals,
〈N〉 |L=0, that Alice needs to send Bob to collect a data
block size equal to nSH when using PDC sources, as a
function of the detection and coupling efficiency ηc,d at
L = 0 km. The free experimental and security
parameters are set to the values that optimize the
secret key rate given by Fig. 6(b). The figure considers
two different data block sizes, i.e., nSH = 10
9 and
nSH = 10
11. All the plots are cut at the value of ηc,d for
which the resulting secret key rate is below the
threshold value of 10−10. Also, we consider both sets of
security requirements (S1 and S2) and, like in Fig. 5,
here we disregard dark counts because their effect at
L = 0 km is negligible.
S1 ηc,d nSH Λ K 〈N〉
ESR 100% 109 13 dB 5.7× 10−8 1015
ESR 98.7% 1011 1 dB 5.9× 10−7 1015
PQA 100% 107 24 dB 1.1× 10−8 1.7× 1013
PQA 98.7% 109 4 dB 5.5× 10−8 1015
S2 ηc,d nSH Λ K 〈N〉
ESR 100% 109 12 dB 4.9× 10−8 1015
ESR 98.7% 1011 0 dB 2.9× 10−7 1015
PQA 100% 107 17 dB 6.9× 10−9 8.6× 1012
PQA 98.7% 109 3 dB 5.7× 10−8 1015
TABLE V: Maximum value of the channel loss, Λ,
before either 〈N〉 ≥ 1015 or the secret key rate K starts
dropping down to zero, depending on the pair
(ηc,d, nSH) and on the qubit amplifier. The considered
detection and coupling efficiencies, as well as the data
block sizes, correspond to the finite-key rates illustrated
in Fig. 7 with security settings S1 and S2. As shown by
the table, in the case of the PQA with ηc,d = 100% and
nSH = 10
7, the secret key rate drops down to zero before
〈N〉 exceeds 1015 signals. To be precise, the cutoff for
S1 (S2) roughly occurs at Λ = 24 dB (17 dB), and the
corresponding 〈N〉 is still 1.7× 1013 (8.6× 1012).
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chitecture, the maximum Λ decreases from 9 (14) dB as
shown in Fig. 7 to roughly 1 (4) dB for nSH = 10
11 (109).
Indeed, in Appendix A 4 we show that, due to similar
time constraints, locating the entanglement source ρab in
the middle of the channel between Alice and Bob, and
furnishing both Alice and Bob with a qubit amplifier,
does not seem to improve the performance that can be
obtained when Alice holds the source and only Bob holds
a qubit amplifier, at least in the case of PDC sources.
C. Generic sources
Finally, in this section we further investigate the effect
that vacuum pulses and multiple photon pairs, gener-
ated by practical entanglement sources, has on the per-
formance of DIQKD. For concreteness, we focus on the
ESR architecture and we consider entanglement sources
generating signals of the form given by Eqs. (1) and
(2). Also, for simplicity, we set pn = 0 for n ≥ 3 with
p2 = 1−p0−p1, the underlying assumption being that the
effect of multiple photon pairs is properly encompassed
by the effect of double photon pairs, which is supported
by our numerical simulations. In doing so, we can charac-
terize the photon-number statistics of the entanglement
sources by means of only two parameters: the probability
p0 of emitting vacuum, and the ratio q = p2/p1 between
the probability of emitting a double photon pair and that
of emitting a single photon pair.
Of course, if one considers a practical entanglement
source, the photon-number statistics pn cannot be con-
trolled separately, but they typically depend on an inten-
sity parameter. For instance, in the case of PDC sources,
we have that pn is fixed for all n once we set the value
of the probability p0 (or, equivalently, the value of λ).
In this type of sources, by using Eq. (3), we have that
q = p2/p1 = (1−p0−p1)/p1 = (p−1/20 −1)(p−1/20 +2)/2 =
qPDC. The case of ideal sources, on the other hand, cor-
responds to p0 = p2 = 0 and thus q = 0. Since both sce-
narios have already been evaluated above, and the case
q > qPDC delivers worse results than those evaluated in
Sec. V B, below we consider combinations of (p0, q) that
satisfy 0 ≤ q < qPDC for the corresponding p0 > 0. In
doing so, we investigate an intermediate scenario between
the photon number statistics of ideal sources and those
of PDC sources.
We remark, however, that Appendix A includes a full
mode analysis, both for the ESR and PQA architectures,
which allows the evaluation of any desired photon num-
ber distribution for the different light sources, including
the contribution of up to any wanted number of photon
pairs per source. That is, such analysis could be used
to investigate any generic source of the form given by
Eqs. (1) and (2).
The results for the simplified scenario discussed above
are illustrated in Fig. 9, which shows the secret key rate
as a function of the channel loss Λ for nSH = 10
9 and
the security requirements given by S1. To simplify the
comparison between this case and the one based on PDC
sources, we use the values of ηc,d employed in Fig. 7,
i.e., ηc,d ∈ {100%, 98.7%}. Moreover, for each value of
ηc,d, we plot three different cases. The first (second)
case, assumes that the entanglement source ρbc (ρab) is an
ideal entanglement source, while ρab (ρbc) is characterized
by the parameters (p0, q). The third case considers that
both ρbc and ρab are characterized by the parameters
(p0, q), which, for simplicity, we assume are the same for
both sources, though, in general, the optimal intensity
for each source will depend of the value of the channel
loss. In each figure, we evaluate two possible values for
p0: p0 = 0.5 (solid lines) and p0 = 0.9 (dotted lines).
Also, we consider four different values for the parameter
q ∈ Q = {0, 10−2, 10−1.5, 10−1}.
In all the plots within Fig. 9, if one compares the solid
lines with the dotted lines, we observe that reducing the
value of the probability p0 for a fixed value of q basically
leads to a rigid increase of the secret key rate. This is
so because vacuum signals rarely lead to false heralding
flags in the qubit amplifier: if ρab (ρbc) emits a vacuum
state, it is necessary that either ρbc (ρab) emits more
than one photon pair or that at least one dark count
takes place at the detectors within the qubit amplifier in
order to have a (spurious) successful heralding event. As
a consequence, to a good extent, p0 affects mainly the
pre-factor PSH, but not the conditional secret key rate,
K|SH. The greater the value of p0, the smaller the value
of PSH, and thus the rigid decrease of the secret key rate.
On the other hand, for a fixed value of p0, increas-
ing q significantly affects K|SH, so that multiple photon
pairs are responsible for the changing slope of the secret
key rate as well as for the position of the cutoff point
where the secret key rate starts dropping down to zero,
as shown in Fig. 9. This is so because multiple photon
pairs lead to spurious heralding events that limit the util-
ity of the qubit amplifier, and, as expected, this effect is
amplified when the detection and coupling efficiency ηc,d
decreases. In this regard, we also note that the perfor-
mance of DIQKD seems to be more robust to the presence
of multiple photon pairs in ρab than in ρbc. The reason
goes as follows. Multi-photons arising from ρab need to
undergo a lossy channel, but multi-photons from ρbc do
not. Therefore, the latter are more likely to trigger a spu-
rious success at the qubit amplifier when the input from
the channel is a vacuum signal. Actually, from Fig. 9 we
observe that the curves with an ideal source ρbc, and ρab
characterized with q = 10−2 or 10−1.5 are relatively close
to the curve corresponding to q = 0. This suggests that
the cutoff points of these curves (at the high loss regime)
are probably mainly due to the dark counts of the detec-
tors at the qubit amplifier, as in the case q = 0, rather
than due to the presence of multiple photon pairs in ρab.
On the contrary, all the curves with an ideal source ρab,
and ρbc characterized with a nonzero q, show an early
cutoff point induced by the multiple photon pairs in ρbc.
Furthermore, we note that the cutoff points match for
p0 = 0.5 and p0 = 0.9 if they are caused by the pres-
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FIG. 9: Secret key rate K as a function of the overall channel loss Λ measured in dB for generic photonic sources
and assuming the ESR architecture. Figure (a) considers a detection and coupling efficiency ηc,d = 100% and figure
(b) considers ηc,d = 98.7%. Each figure evaluates three different cases. The first (second) case, assumes that the
entanglement source ρbc (ρab) is an ideal entanglement source, while ρab (ρbc) is characterized by the parameters p0
and q = p2/p1. The third case considers that both ρbc and ρab are characterized by the parameters p0 and
q = p2/p1. All figures consider two possible values for p0, i.e., p0 = 0.5 (solid lines) and p0 = 0.9 (dotted lines), and
four different values for the parameter q ∈ Q = {0, 10−2, 10−1.5, 10−1}. Also, for concreteness, in all cases we set
nSH = 10
9 and choose the security settings S1.
ence of multiple photon pairs, but they do not match
if they are caused by the dark counts of the detectors.
This is so because, in the former case, the cutoff point is
roughly determined by the double-to-single photon pair
ratio (i.e., by the parameter q), while in the latter case
it is determined by the dark count to single photon pair
ratio, which is different for each curve. Either way, Fig. 9
suggests that the noise induced by multiple photon pairs
generated by the sources, particularly those generated by
the sources within the qubit amplifier, seems to be the
major challenge to achieve long-distance DIQKD with
the considered setup.
This effect is investigated further in Fig. 10, where we
plot an upper bound on the maximum value of the pa-
rameter q, which we denote by qmax, to achieve K ≥ 0
with 〈N〉 ≤ 1015, as a function of the channel loss Λ. For
this, we assume that the source ρab is an ideal source and
we parametrize the source ρbc with the quantity q. Note
that since here we use the condition that the secret key
rate is strictly greater than zero, we can set the param-
eter p0 corresponding to ρbc to zero. This is so because
setting p0 > 0 simply translates into a rigid decrease of
the secret key rate, thus not affecting the value of qmax.
That is, we define qmax = minp1 {(1− p1)/p1|K ≥ 0}. In
addition, and in order to investigate the limitations im-
posed by the noise due to multiple photon pairs alone, we
set pd = 0. In this scenario, Fig. 10 suggests that, irre-
spectively of the block size nSH, the value of the detector
efficiency ηc,d and the security settings, the double-to-
single photon pair ratio q severely restricts the maximum
distance that is achievable with DIQKD. Moreover, note
that in a realistic situation with a non-ideal ρab, qmax
would be lower than the value shown in Fig. 10. The
vertical cutoffs in the graphs indicate the points where
〈N〉 ≈ 1015, as this value is already probably too large
for a QKD session today. Since qmax is very small at the
cutoff points, the corresponding values of Λ are very close
(indistinguishable to our numerical precision) to those of
the case q = 0, which are given by
Λ = 150− 10 log10
(
2nSH
η4c,d
)
(27)
for the different pairs (ηc,d, nSH). This expression is di-
rectly obtained from Eq. (25) assuming pd = 0.
As a final remark, note that one might achieve a source
whose parameter q < qmax for a given distance by sim-
ply decreasing the intensity of the source. Indeed, this is
the case, for example, of PDC sources, where one can re-
duce λ and thus q at the price of significantly increasing
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FIG. 10: Upper bound on the maximum
double-to-single photon pair ratio qmax of the
entanglement source ρbc required to achieve K ≥ 0 with
〈N〉 ≤ 1015, as a function of the channel loss Λ. Here,
we set pd = 0, so that the multiphotons generated in
the qubit amplifier are the only source of noise in the
system. The bluish lines use coupling and detection
efficiency ηc,d = 100% and they include the block sizes
nSH = 10
11, 109 and 107, while the yellow lines use
ηc,d = 96.5% and they only include the case nSH = 10
11.
This is so because nSH = 10
9 and nSH = 10
7 do not
deliver a positive secret key rate for ηc,d = 96.5%. Also,
for each pair (ηc,d, nSH), the graphs corresponding to
both sets of security settings, S1 and S2, are included
whenever they are significantly different. Otherwise, we
only plot that of S1 for simplicity. The vertical cutoffs
in the graphs indicate the points where 〈N〉 ≈ 1015. As
expected, when ηc,d decreases the value of qmax
decreases as well.
the probability p0 of emitting vacuum. While this might
provide a positive key rate according to Fig. 10 (by as-
suming still that ρab is an ideal source), the resulting
secret key rate might be probably too low to be practical
because the probability of having a successful heralding
event would be very low. The situation gets worse in the
presence of dark counts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Device independence is a desirable feature for quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) to ultimately defeat quan-
tum hacking. However, it comes at a high price, in terms
of achievable performance and required resources. In-
deed, long distance device-independent QKD (DIQKD)
requires the use of fair-sampling devices, like for instance
qubit amplifiers, which can herald the arrival of a pho-
ton and thus decouple channel loss from the measurement
settings selection.
In this work, we have investigated all-photonic DIQKD
assisted by two general types of qubit amplifiers—
entanglement swapping relays and polarization qubit
amplifiers—in the finite-key regime. In doing so, we have
quantified some crucial experimental parameters that are
essential to achieve DIQKD over practical distances and
within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.
This includes, for example, the minimum value of the de-
tection efficiency of the photodetectors and the quality of
the entanglement light sources, in terms of their vacuum
and multi-photon contributions. In this regard, we have
shown that, even if perfect entanglement sources and
photon-number-resolving detectors were available, the
ability to achieve large enough violations of a loophole-
free CHSH test, within a DIQKD session of a reasonable
time duration, already imposes very strong restrictions
on the minimum detection efficiency (& 96, 5%), which
further increases quickly with the length of the transmis-
sion link. Similarly, we have shown that multi-photon
pulses emitted by practical entanglement sources have a
severe effect on the performance of DIQKD assisted by
qubit amplifiers, as multiple photon pairs lead to spurious
heading successes that strongly decrease the conditional
secret key rate.
Altogether, our results suggest that the possibility of
implementing DIQKD over long distances is probably
quite far-off, as it seems to require a significant improve-
ment of our current experimental capabilities.
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Appendix A: Honest implementations
Here, we present the main calculations needed to repro-
duce our simulation results. For this, we use the mathe-
matical models introduced in the main text. As already
mentioned in Sec. II, we model channel, coupling and
detection loss with a beamsplitter (BS), whose unitary
transformation is of the form
a†h,v −→
√
ηc†h,v +
√
1− ηd†h,v,
b†h,v −→
√
ηd†h,v −
√
1− ηc†h,v, (A1)
where the input mode a is the quantum signal, the in-
put mode b is a vacuum state, the output mode c is the
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optical fiber, and the output mode d represents loss. In
Eq. (A1), the subscript “h, v” indicates again horizontal
and vertical polarization respectively. That is, the BS
transformation given by Eq. (A1) applies to both polar-
izations.
Similarly, polarization modulators are simply de-
scribed by a rotation that transforms the input modes
a†h and a
†
v as follows
a†h −→ cos θb†h + sin θb†v,
a†v −→ cos θb†v − sin θb†h, (A2)
where b†h and b
†
v denote the output modes. The case
θ = pi/4 corresponds to the Hadamard transformation.
1. Entanglement swapping relay
Here, we calculate the parameters PSH, Q|SH and ω|SH
for an honest implementation of the DIQKD protocol
assisted by an ESR at Bob’s side. A schematic of the
mathematical model that describes the optical setup is
given in Fig. (11). This figure includes all the parame-
ters and the relevant notation that shall be used in what
follows.
a. Click pattern distribution
Since all photodetectors are described with a POVM
whose elements are diagonal in the Fock basis (see
Eq. (7)), for convenience we will consider that Alice’s
source emits mixed states of the form
σab =
∞∑
n=0
pn|φn〉ab〈φn|, (A3)
instead of pure states |ψ〉ab =
∑∞
n=0
√
pn|φn〉ab (see
Eq. (2) for the explicit expression of |φn〉ab). Both states
deliver exactly the same output statistics when measured
in the Fock basis, and thus we can use the state σab for
the calculations below.
Similarly, we will consider that the state emitted by
the entanglement source within the qubit amplifier is of
the form
σcd =
∞∑
n=0
p′n|φn〉cd〈φn|, (A4)
where the apostrophe in p′n indicates that the statistics
of σcd are generally different from those of σab. For in-
stance, σab and σcd could originate from PDC sources
with different intensity parameters.
The starting point for our calculations is then the
quantum state
ρ0 = σab ⊗ σcd =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
n′=0
pnp
′
n′ |φn〉ab〈φn| ⊗ |φn′〉cd〈φn′ |. (A5)
Prior to the interference in the linear optics BSM, the
states σab and σcd evolve separately. In particular, let
us focus on the evolution of σab first. We have that the
states |φn〉ab can be written as
|φn〉ab =
1
n!
√
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(−1)i(a†vb†h)i(a†hb†v)n−i|0〉.
(A6)
Here and in what follows, we shall simply use |0〉 to de-
note the vacuum state in all spatial modes. Since all de-
tectors are assumed to have the same detection efficiency,
ηd, we model them by means of a BS of transmittance
ηd together with lossless PNR detectors, whose POVM
elements are simply given by projectors onto Fock states:
Πj = |j〉〈j|, j ∈ N. The effect of dark counts is incor-
porated a posteriori. This model is equivalent to that
given by Eq. (6). Moreover, we combine the effect of fi-
nite detection efficiency and coupling efficiency (as well
as channel loss) in one BS of transmittance ζc,d = ηcηd
(ζc,ch,d = ηcηchηd, where ηch = 10
−Λ/10 is the transmis-
sion efficiency of the fiber link connecting Alice’s and
Bob’s labs, which depends on the channel loss Λ). In
doing so, we find that the quantum states |φn〉ab evolve
to
|φn〉a1b1;f1g1 =
1
n!
√
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
i∑
k=0
n−i∑
l=0
n−i∑
m=0
(−1)i
(
n
i
)(
i
j
)(
i
k
)(
n− i
l
)(
n− i
m
)
T j+lc,d T
k+m
c,ch,dR
n−j−l
c,d R
n−k−m
c,ch,d
× a†1,h
l
a†1,v
j
b†1,h
k
b†1,v
m
f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m|0〉, (A7)
where the different modes are illustrated in Fig. (11). In
Eq. (A7) we define Tc,d = ζc,d
1/2, Tc,ch,d = ζc,ch,d
1/2,
Rc,d = (1 − ζc,d)1/2 and Rc,ch,d = (1 − ζc,ch,d)1/2 for
readability.
Similarly, the state σcd within the ESR undergoes a
similar transformation, so that the pure states |φn′〉cd
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FIG. 11: Schematic of the ESR-based DIQKD setup matching the mathematical models presented in the main text:
σab and σcd stand for the entanglement sources, θA (θB) denotes the rotation angle of Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement
settings and ζc,d and ζc,ch,d tag the effective efficiency parameters, ζc,d = ηcηd and ζc,ch,d = ηcηchηd, where ηc, ηd
and ηch denote, respectively, the transmittance of the BSs modeling the coupling loss, the detection inefficiency of
the detectors and the channel loss. The symbol “⊕” is used to denote the PBSs that precede the photodetectors.
The latin letters in blue color indicate the different modes, while the greek letters in red color are used to tag the
number of photons observed at each of the detectors in any given detection event. The output modes f1, g1, p1 and
q1 correspond to the losses, |0〉 is the vacuum state, and a dashed grey rectangle identifies the ESR.
evolve to |φn′〉c1d1;p1q1 , whose form is identical to that
of |φn〉a1b1;f1g1 but taking Tc,ch,d → Tc,d and Rc,ch,d →
Rc,d, and now obviously referred to the modes c1, d1, p1
and q1 (instead of a1, b1, f1 and g1).
Putting it all together, the overall quantum state prior
to the interference in the ESR is given by
ρBSM =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
n′=0
pnp
′
n′ |φn〉a1b1;f1g1〈φn|
⊗ |φn′〉c1d1;p1q1〈φn′ |, (A8)
where the pure states |φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗ |φn′〉c1d1;p1q1 are
written as
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|φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗ |φn′〉c1d1;p1q1 =
1
n!n′!
√
(n+ 1)(n′ + 1)
n∑
i=0
n′∑
x=0
i∑
j=0
x∑
y=0
i∑
k=0
x∑
z=0
n−i∑
l=0
n′−x∑
t=0
n−i∑
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n′−x∑
w=0
(−1)i+x
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n
i
)(
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x
)(
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j
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x
y
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k
)(
x
z
)(
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l
)(
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t
)(
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m
)(
n′ − x
w
)
T j+l+y+z+t+wc,d T
k+m
c,ch,dR
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c,d R
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†
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l
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× b†1,h
k
b†1,v
m
c†1,h
t
c†1,v
y
d†1,h
z
d†1,v
w
f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n′−x−t
p†1,v
x−y
q†1,h
x−z
q†1,v
n′−x−w|0〉. (A9)
Next, modes b1 and c1 interfere at a 50:50 BS within the
ESR. The corresponding transformation is given by
b†1,h
k
b†1,v
m
c†1,h
t
c†1,v
y 50:50−−−→
k∑
h=0
m∑
r=0
t∑
u=0
y∑
v=0
(−1)u+v
√
2
k+m+t+y
×
(
k
h
)(
m
r
)(
t
u
)(
y
v
)
b†2,h
h+u
b†2,v
r+v
c†2,h
k+t−h−u
× c†2,v
m+y−r−v
. (A10)
If we define the sum variables s = h + u and o = r + v,
and we use the fact that a rectangle {0 ≤ a ≤ A, 0 ≤
b ≤ B} can be equivalently characterized by {0 ≤ s ≤
A+B,max(0, s−A) ≤ b ≤ min(s,B)}, we have that the
RHS of Eq. (A10) can be written as
k+t∑
s=0
m+y∑
o=0
min{s,t}∑
u=max{0,s−k}
min{o,y}∑
v=max{0,o−m}
(−1)u+v
√
2
k+m+t+y
×
(
k
s− u
)(
m
o− v
)(
t
u
)(
y
v
)
b†2,h
s
b†2,v
o
c†2,h
k+t−s
× c†2,v
m+y−o
. (A11)
This means that the state |φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗ |φn′〉c1d1;p1q1 is
transformed into |φn,n′〉a1b2c2d1;f1g1p1q1 given by
|φn,n′〉a1b2c2d1;f1g1p1q1 =
1
n!n′!
√
(n+ 1)(n′ + 1)
n∑
i=0
n′∑
x=0
i∑
j=0
x∑
y=0
i∑
k=0
x∑
z=0
n−i∑
l=0
n′−x∑
t=0
n−i∑
m=0
n′−x∑
w=0
k+t∑
s=0
m+y∑
o=0
min{s,t}∑
u=max{0,s−k}
×
min{o,y}∑
v=max{0,o−m}
(−1)i+x+u+v
√
2
k+m+t+y
(
n
i
)(
n′
x
)(
i
j
)(
x
y
)(
i
k
)(
x
z
)(
n− i
l
)(
n′ − x
t
)(
n− i
m
)(
n′ − x
w
)(
k
s− u
)(
m
o− v
)(
t
u
)
×
(
y
v
)
T j+l+y+z+t+wc,d T
k+m
c,ch,dR
n+2n′−j−l−y−z−t−w
c,d R
n−k−m
c,ch,d a
†
1,h
l
a†1,v
j
d†1,h
z
d†1,v
w
b†2,h
s
b†2,v
o
c†2,h
k+t−s
c†2,v
m+y−o
× f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n′−x−t
p†1,v
x−y
q†1,h
x−z
q†1,v
n′−x−w|0〉. (A12)
Now, we incorporate Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
settings by transforming the operators of the affected
modes, a1 and d1, with rotation angles θA and θB, respec-
tively. We denote the corresponding output pure state by
|φn,n′〉θA,θBa2b2c2d2;f1g1p1q1 , and it is given by
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|φn,n′〉θA,θBa2b2c2d2;f1g1p1q1 =
1
n!n′!
√
(n+ 1)(n′ + 1)
n∑
i=0
n′∑
x=0
i∑
j=0
x∑
y=0
i∑
k=0
x∑
z=0
n−i∑
l=0
n′−x∑
t=0
n−i∑
m=0
n′−x∑
w=0
k+t∑
s=0
m+y∑
o=0
min{s,t}∑
u=max{0,s−k}
×
min{o,y}∑
v=max{0,o−m}
l+j∑
e=0
z+w∑
r=0
min{e,j}∑
h=max{0,e−l}
min{r,w}∑
n˜=max{0,r−z}
(
n
i
)(
n′
x
)(
i
j
)(
x
y
)(
i
k
)(
x
z
)(
n− i
l
)(
n′ − x
t
)(
n− i
m
)(
n′ − x
w
)
×
(
k
s− u
)(
m
o− v
)(
t
u
)(
y
v
)(
l
e− h
)(
j
h
)(
z
r − n˜
)(
w
n˜
)
(−1)i+x+u+v+h+n˜
√
2
k+m+t+y
T j+l+y+z+t+wc,d T
k+m
c,ch,dR
n+2n′−j−l−y−z−t−w
c,d
×Rn−k−mc,ch,d cos θAe+j−2h sin θAl+2h−e cos θBr+w−2n˜ sin θBz+2n˜−ra†2,h
e
a†2,v
l+j−e
d†2,h
r
d†2,v
z+w−r
b†2,h
s
b†2,v
o
c†2,h
k+t−s
× c†2,v
m+y−o
f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n′−x−t
p†1,v
x−y
q†1,h
x−z
q†1,v
n′−x−w|0〉. (A13)
That is, Eq. (A13) describes the quantum state immedi-
ately prior to the detectors, conditioned on the photon
pair numbers n and n′.
Importantly, as the detection efficiencies of all de-
tectors were already accounted for in the effective BS
models, projective measurements onto Fock states must
be considered now, as explained above. More pre-
cisely, we are interested in the conditional probability,
P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB , of observing a detection pattern ~α given
the quantum state |φn,n′〉θA,θBa2b2c2d2;f1g1p1q1 . Here, we in-
troduced the vector notation ~α = (α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ),
where each element of the vector denotes the number of
photons in a certain output mode: α refers to mode a2,h,
β to mode a2,v, γ to mode d2,h, δ to mode d2,v, µ to mode
c2,h, ν to mode c2,v, τ to mode b2,h and λ to mode b2,v.
With this notation, and if we disregard for the moment
the effect of dark counts, we have that P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB is
given by
P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB =
∥∥∥|φ˜n,n′〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1∥∥∥2 , (A14)
where the unnormalized state |φ˜n,n′〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1 has the
form
|φ˜n,n′〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1 = 〈~α|φn,n′〉
θA,θB
a2b2c2d2;f1g1p1q1
, (A15)
being |~α〉 = |α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ〉.
To compute |φ˜n,n′〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1 , we make use of the fol-
lowing orthogonality relation:
〈~α|a†2,h
e
a†2,v
l+j−e
d†2,h
r
d†2,v
z+w−r
c†2,h
k+t−s
c†2,v
m+y−o
b†2,h
s
× b†2,v
o|0〉 = (α!β!γ!δ!µ!ν!τ !λ!)1/2 δeαδl+j−eβ δrγδz+w−rδ
× δk+t−sµ δm+y−oν δsτδoλ, (A16)
where δji stands for the Kronecker’s delta symbol, i.e.,
δji = 1 only if i = j, otherwise it is zero. Also,
we recall that for finite range sums,
∑A2
a=A1
f(a)δax =
f(x)Θx−A1ΘA2−x, where Θj is the “discrete” Heaviside
function [55]. Then, in order to incorporate the effect
of the different Θ’s, one must modify the affected index
ranges accordingly. This yields
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|φ˜n,n′〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1 =
1
n!n′!
[
α!β!γ!δ!µ!ν!τ !λ!
(n+ 1)(n′ + 1)2µ+ν+τ+λ
] 1
2
Tα+β+γ+δ+µ+τc,d T
ν+λ
c,ch,dR
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c,d R
n−ν−λ
c,ch,d cos θA
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× sin θAβ cos θBγ sin θBδ
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min{i,α+β}∑
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min{x,ν+λ}∑
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min{i,µ+τ}∑
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min{n′−x,γ+δ}∑
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min{τ,µ+τ−k}∑
u=max{0,τ−k}
×
min{λ,y}∑
v=max{0,y−ν}
min{α,j}∑
h=max{0,j−β}
min{γ,w}∑
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(
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i
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n′
x
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i
j
)(
x
y
)(
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k
)(
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)(
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)(
n′ − x
µ+ τ − k
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w
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×
(
n− i
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)(
n′ − x
w
)(
k
τ − u
)(
ν + λ− y
λ− v
)(
µ+ τ − k
u
)(
y
v
)(
α+ β − j
α− h
)(
j
h
)(
γ + δ − w
γ − n˜
)(
Tc,dRc,ch,d
Tc,ch,dRc,d
)y−k
× (−1)i+x+u+v+h+n˜ cos θAj−2h sin θA2h−j cos θBw−2n˜ sin θB2n˜−wf†1,h
n+j−i−α−β
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n+y−i−ν−λ
× p†1,h
n′+k−x−µ−τ
p†1,v
x−y
q†1,h
x+w−γ−δ
q†1,v
n′−x−w|0〉, (A17)
where some overall constant terms were factored from the
sums.
Then, by applying Eq. (A14) on the state given by
Eq. (A17), we obtain
P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB =
α!β!γ!δ!µ!ν!τ !λ!ην+λB
(n+ 1)(n′ + 1)2µ+ν+τ+λ
ηα+β+γ+δ+µ+τA (1− ζc,d)n+2n
′−α−β−γ−δ−µ−τ (1− ζc,ch,d)n−ν−λ cos θA2α
× sin θA2β cos θB2γ sin θB2δ
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
∆=−i
min{n′,n′−∆}∑
x=max{0,−∆}
min{i,α+β,α+β−∆}∑
j=max{0,α+β+i−n,−∆}
min{x,ν+λ,ν+λ−∆}∑
y=max{0,ν+λ+i−n,−∆}
min{i,µ+τ,µ+τ−∆}∑
k=max{0,µ+τ+x−n′,−∆}
×
min{n′−x,γ+δ,γ+δ+∆}∑
w=max{0,γ+δ−x,∆}
min{τ,µ+τ−k}∑
u=max{0,τ−k}
min{τ,µ+τ−k−∆}∑
U=max{0,τ−k−∆}
min{λ,y}∑
v=max{0,y−ν}
min{λ,y+∆}∑
V=max{0,y+∆−ν}
min{α,j}∑
h=max{0,j−β}
min{α,j+∆}∑
H=max{0,j+∆−β}
×
min{γ,w}∑
n˜=max{0,w−δ}
min{γ,w−∆}∑
N˜=max{0,w−∆−δ}
[
ζc,d(1− ζc,ch,d)
ζc,ch,d(1− ζc,d)
]y−k
(−1)u+v+h+n˜+U+V+H+N˜
(
sin θA
cos θA
)2(h+H−j)−∆
×
(
sin θB
cos θB
)2(n˜+N˜−w)+∆
Υ(n, n′, i, x, j, y, k, w, u, U, v, V, h,H, n˜, N˜ ,∆, α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ), (A18)
where we have defined
Υ(n, n′, i, x, j, y, k, w, u, U, v, V, h,H, n˜, N˜ ,∆, α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ) =
× i!(i+ ∆)!x!(x+ ∆)!(n− i)!(n− i−∆)!(n′ − x)!(n′ − x−∆)!(i− j)!(x− y)!(i− k)!
× [(x+ w − γ − δ)!(n+ j − i− α− β)!(n
′ + k − x− µ− τ)!(n+ y − i− ν − λ)!(n′ − x− w)!]−1
h!H!(j − h)!(j + ∆−H)!v!V !(y − v)!(y + ∆− V )!(τ − u)!(τ − U)!(k + u− τ)!(k + ∆ + U − τ)!
× [(γ − n˜)!(γ − N˜)!(δ + n˜− w)!(δ + N˜ + ∆− w)!(α− h)!(α−H)!(β + h− j)!(β +H − j −∆)!u!U !]
−1
(µ+ τ − k − u)!(µ+ τ − k −∆− U)!(λ− v)!(λ− V )!(ν + v − y)!(ν + V − y −∆)!n˜!N˜ !(w − n˜)!(w −∆− N˜)! .
(A19)
Of course, the condition
∑
~α P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB = 1 holds, and only those click patterns ~α such that α + β ≤ n,
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γ+δ ≤ n′ and µ+ν+τ+λ ≤ n+ n′ give a non vanishing
contribution due to the absence of noise, which we take
into account next.
In particular, if one considers the noise model intro-
duced in the main text, we find that the resulting distri-
bution in the noisy scenario is given by
P˜ (~α|n, n′)θA,θB = (1− 8pd)P (~α|n, n′)θA,θB
+ pd
∑
~σ∈Γ~α
P (~σ|n, n′)θA,θB +O(p2d),
(A20)
where Γ~α = {~σ : |~α| = |~σ|+ 1}, |~α| being the overall
number of photons corresponding to the pattern ~α, i.e.,
|~α| = α + β + γ + δ + µ + ν + τ + λ. As a consequence,
and up to first order in pd, we have that P˜ (~α|n, n′)θA,θB
vanishes for any pattern ~α that does not fulfill α + β ≤
n+ 1, γ + δ ≤ n′ + 1, µ + ν + τ + λ ≤ n+ n′ + 1 and
α+ β + γ + δ + µ+ ν + τ + λ ≤ 2(n+ n′) + 1.
Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are expected to be anti-
correlated, as the entanglement sources we are consid-
ering emit singlet states. Therefore, we flip say Alice’s
outcomes in such a way that, whenever Alice and Bob se-
lect the same measurement settings, their outcomes are
correlated. For this, we define the distribution
p˜ (~α|n, n′)θA,θB = P˜α↔β (~α|n, n′)θA,θB . (A21)
That is to say, p˜ (α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB =
P˜ (β, α, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB .
Finally, it only remains to take into account the deter-
ministic assignment performed by Alice and Bob when-
ever they observe an inconclusive event, required to have
a distribution with binary outcomes on both sides. To
be precise, the assignments read
AA =
{
0 if (α, β) = (1, 0)
1 otherwise,
AB =
{
0 if (γ, δ) = (1, 0)
1 otherwise.
(A22)
In this way, every possible event (α, β, γ, δ) re-
garding Alice’s and Bob’s detector outcomes is
mapped to an element of the set of binary strings
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
Importantly, we remark that such a post-processing
is not performed on the outcomes of the photodetectors
inside the qubit amplifier, but only on the outcomes ob-
served by the parties. In summary, the distribution we
are finally interested in is that of the “post-processed
click pattern” A~α = (AA, AB, µ, ν, τ, λ), which we shall
denote by P(A~α|n, n′)θA,θB . From Eqs. (A22), it is obvi-
ous that
P(0, 0, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB =
p˜ (1, 0, 1, 0, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB ,
P(0, 1, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB =∑
(γ,δ) 6=(1,0)
p˜ (1, 0, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB ,
P(1, 0, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB =∑
(α,β)6=(1,0)
p˜ (α, β, 1, 0, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB
P(1, 1, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB =∑
(α,β)6=(1,0)
∑
(γ,δ)6=(1,0)
p˜ (α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ|n, n′)θA,θB .
(A23)
b. Parameters PSH, Q|SH and ω|SH
To obtain the value of these parameters we have
to take into account that there are four differ-
ent click patterns in the ESR which are con-
sidered to be successful heralding events, as ex-
plained in the main text. These are (µ, ν, τ, λ) =
{(1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1)}. Due to the
symmetries of the channel model, we can consider only
one of these successful heralding events, say Ω =
{(µ, ν, τ, λ) = (1, 1, 0, 0)}, and the next holds: PSH =
4PΩ, ω|SH = ω|Ω and Q|SH = Q|Ω. As a consequence, we
can restrict ourselves to the calculation of PΩ, Q|Ω and
ω|Ω.
To begin with, we have that the probability PΩ is sim-
ply given by
PΩ =
∑
AA,AB
P(AA, AB,Ω)θA,θB =∑
n,n′
pnp
′
n′
∑
AA,AB
P(AA, AB,Ω|n, n′)θA,θB , (A24)
where AA, AB ∈ {0, 1}. Obviously, since we are summing
over all possible measurement outcomes for Alice and
Bob in Eq. (A24), PΩ does not depend on the rotation
angles θA and θB. Therefore, one can simply set them
both to zero for the numerical calculations.
Secondly, the conditional QBER is given by
Q|Ω = 1
PΩ
[P(0, 1,Ω)0,0 +P(1, 0,Ω)0,0]
=
1
PΩ
∑
n,n′
pnp
′
n′ [P(0, 1,Ω|n, n′)0,0 +P(1, 0,Ω|n, n′)0,0] .
(A25)
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We remark that this quantity is referred to the events in
which both parties select the Z-basis, so that θA = θB =
0.
Finally, the conditional winning probability at the
CHSH game, ω|Ω, can be defined in terms of the con-
ditional CHSH violation, S|Ω, via
ω|Ω = 1
8
S|Ω + 1
2
, (A26)
where [56]
S|Ω = E0,−pi8 |Ω + E0,pi8 |Ω + Epi4 ,−pi8 |Ω − Epi4 ,pi8 |Ω, (A27)
and the parameters EθA,θB |Ω are given by
EθA,θB |Ω =
1
PΩ
[P(1, 1,Ω)θA,θB +P(0, 0,Ω)θA,θB ]
− 1
PΩ
[P(0, 1,Ω)θA,θB +P(1, 0,Ω)θA,θB ]
=
2
PΩ
∑
n,n′
pnp
′
n′ [P(0, 0,Ω|n, n′)θA,θB
+ P(1, 1,Ω|n, n′)θA,θB ]− 1. (A28)
We note that in the second equality of Eq. (A28), we
simply used Eq. (A24) and the law of total probability,
conditioning on the photon numbers n and n′.
2. Polarizing qubit amplifier
In this Appendix we now consider a PQA-based imple-
mentation of the DIQKD protocol. A schematic of the
mathematical model that describes the optical setup is
illustrated in Fig. (12).
In contrast to the ESR-based implementation, Alice
and Bob only keep those detection events for which, first,
both triggered single-photon sources at Bob’s lab record
one photon in their idler mode, and second, a successful
BSM occurs. For this reason, we need to calculate the
trigger probability Ptrigger at the idler mode of a source
of this kind, and the conditional quantum state ρsingle at
its signal mode, given that a trigger occurred. This is
what we do next.
a. Triggered single-photon sources
As described in the main text, we shall consider trig-
gered single-photon sources generated by measuring the
idler mode of an entanglement state of the form |Ψ〉 =∑∞
n=0
√
pn|n, n〉.
We have that Ptrigger can be written as
Ptrigger = (1− pd)Ptrigger|0d + pdPtrigger|1d, (A29)
where Ptrigger|0d (Ptrigger|1d) denotes de trigger probabil-
ity given that there is no dark count (one single dark
count) in the detector. These conditional probabilities
can be written as
Ptrigger|0d =
∞∑
n=0
pnPtrigger|n,0d,
Ptrigger|1d =
∞∑
n=0
pnPtrigger|n,1d. (A30)
where Ptrigger|n,0d = nζc,d(1− ζc,d)n−1 and Ptrigger|n,1d =
(1−ζc,d)n. Here, like in Appendix A 1, ζc,d = ηcηd with ηc
and ηd being, respectively, the coupling and the detection
efficiencies.
Similarly, the conditional quantum state at the signal
mode given that a trigger occurred has the form ρsingle =∑∞
n=0 rn|n〉〈n|, where the probability distribution rn can
be written as:
rn =
pn[(1− pd)Ptrigger|n,0d + pdPtrigger|n,1d]
Ptrigger
. (A31)
For example, in the case of a triggered PDC source
with pn = µ
n(1 + µ)−n−1 we find that Ptrigger|0d =
µζc,d(1+µζc,d)
−2, and Ptrigger|1d = (1+µζc,d)−1. Hence,
Ptrigger =
pd + µζc,d
(1 + µζc,d)2
. (A32)
Also, we obtain
rn =
µn(1− ζc,d)n−1(1 + µζc,d)2
(1 + µ)n+1(pd + µζc,d)
× [(1− pd)nζc,d + pd(1− ζc,d)] . (A33)
In what follows, we will use the notation ρhsingle and
ρvsingle in order to specify the polarization state of the
generated photons.
b. Click pattern distribution
Our starting point is the state of the whole system
conditioned on the trigger of both triggered single-photon
sources at Bob’s PQA,
ρ0|double trigger = σab ⊗ ρhsingle ⊗ ρvsingle
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
n1=0
∞∑
n2=0
pnrn1rn2 |φn〉ab〈φn| ⊗ |n1, n2〉d〈n1, n2|,
(A34)
where |n1, n2〉d = d†h
n1
d†v
n2
/
√
n1!n2!|0〉.
Next, we have that the quantum states |φn〉ab undergo
exactly the same transformation as in the case of the
ESR-based setup (see Fig. (11)), leading to the states
|φn〉a1b1;f1g1 given by Eq. (A7) right before the interfer-
ence at the BSM.
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FIG. 12: Schematic of the PQA-based DIQKD setup matching the mathematical models presented in the main text.
σab stands for the entanglement source held by Alice, while ρ
h
single and ρ
v
single denote the single-photon sources inside
the PQA. θA (θB) denotes the rotation angle of Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement settings and ζc,d and ζc,ch,d tag the
effective efficiency parameters, ζc,d = ηcηd and ζc,ch,d = ηcηchηd, where ηc, ηd and ηch denote, respectively, the
transmittance of the BSs modeling the coupling loss, the detection inefficiency and the channel loss. Again, the
symbol “⊕” is used to denote the PBSs that precede the photodetectors. Similarly, the latin letters in blue color
indicate the different modes, while the greek letters in red color are used to tag the number of photons observed at
each of the detectors. The output modes f1, g1, p1 and q1 correspond to the losses, |0〉 is the vacuum state, t is the
tunable transmittance of the BS within the PQA, two Hadamard gates are denoted by H, and a dashed grey
rectangle identifies the PQA.
On the other hand, the states |n1, n2〉d evolve to
|ψn1 , ψn2〉d1;p1q1 =
1√
n1!n2!
n1∑
x=0
n2∑
y=0
(
n1
x
)(
n2
y
)
T x+yc,d
×Rn1+n2−x−yc,d d†h
x
d†v
y
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉, (A35)
where Tc,d = ζc,d
1/2 and Rc,d = (1 − ζc,d)1/2 as in
Appendix A 1. Here, like in the ESR-based setup, we
have modeled the effect of coupling and detection loss
by means of a BS with transmittance ζc,d = ηcηd. This
means that for the remaining calculations we consider
lossless PNR detectors.
Next, the quantum signals coming from both single-
photon sources enter a BS of transmittance t. This BS
transforms the quantum states |ψn1 , ψn2〉d1;p1q1 into
|ψn1 , ψn2〉c1d2;p1q1 =
1√
n1!n2!
n1∑
x=0
n2∑
y=0
x∑
z=0
y∑
w=0
(
n1
x
)(
n2
y
)(
x
z
)(
y
w
)
T x+yc,d R
n1+n2−x−y
c,d T
z+w
t R
x+y−z−w
t d
†
2,h
z
d†2,v
w
× c†1,h
x−z
c†1,v
y−w
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉, (A36)
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where Tt = t
1/2.
Afterwards, we have that two Hadamard gates rotate
the outgoing signals at each output port of the beam-
splitter. These Hadamard gates transform the operator
d†2,h
z
d†2,v
w
c†1,h
x−z
c†1,v
y−w
as
d†2,h
z
d†2,v
w
c†1,h
x−z
c†1,v
y−w Hadamard−−−−−−→
z∑
a=0
w∑
b=0
x−z∑
c=0
y−w∑
d=0
(−1)b+d√
2
x+y
(
z
a
)(
w
b
)(
x− z
c
)(
y − w
d
)
d†3,h
a+b
d†3,v
z+w−a−b
× c†2,h
c+d
c†2,v
x+y−z−w−c−d
. (A37)
By using the same change of variables that we applied to
Eq. (A10), we have that Eq. (A37) can be rewritten as
z+w∑
u=0
x+y−z−w∑
r=0
min{w,u}∑
v=max{0,u−z}
min{y−w,r}∑
s=max{0,r+z−x}
(−1)v+s√
2
x+y
×
(
z
u− v
)(
w
v
)(
x− z
r − s
)(
y − w
s
)
d†3,h
u
d†3,v
z+w−u
c†2,h
r
× c†2,v
x+y−z−w−r
. (A38)
By combining Eqs. (A36) and (A38), we obtain the quan-
tum states that emerge from the PQA for the teleporta-
tion
|ψn1,n2〉c2d3;p1q1 =
1√
n1!n2!
n1∑
x=0
n2∑
y=0
x∑
z=0
y∑
w=0
z+w∑
u=0
x+y−z−w∑
r=0
min{w,u}∑
v=max{0,u−z}
min{y−w,r}∑
s=max{0,r+z−x}
(−1)v+s√
2
x+y
(
n1
x
)(
n2
y
)(
x
z
)
×
(
y
w
)(
z
u− v
)(
w
v
)(
x− z
r − s
)(
y − w
s
)
T x+yc,d
×Rn1+n2−x−yc,d T z+wt Rx+y−z−wt d†3,h
u
d†3,v
z+w−u
c†2,h
r
× c†2,v
x+y−z−w−r
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉. (A39)
Then, by putting it all together, we have that the over-
all quantum state prior to the BSM is given by
ρBSM|double trigger =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
n1=0
∞∑
n2=0
pnrn1rn2
× |φn〉a1b1;f1g1〈φn| ⊗ |ψn1,n2〉c2d3;p1q1〈ψn1,n2 |, (A40)
where the pure states |φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗ |ψn1,n2〉c2d3;p1q1 can
be written as
|φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗ |ψn1,n2〉c2d3;p1q1 =
1
n!
√
(n+ 1)n1!n2!
n∑
i=0
n1∑
x=0
n2∑
y=0
i∑
j=0
i∑
k=0
n−i∑
l=0
n−i∑
m=0
x∑
z=0
y∑
w=0
z+w∑
u=0
x+y−z−w∑
r=0
min{w,u}∑
v=max{0,u−z}
min{y−w,r}∑
s=max{0,r+z−x}
(−1)i+v+s√
2
x+y
(
n
i
)(
n1
x
)(
n2
y
)(
i
j
)(
i
k
)(
n− i
l
)(
n− i
m
)(
x
z
)(
y
w
)(
z
u− v
)(
w
v
)(
x− z
r − s
)(
y − w
s
)
× T j+l+x+yc,d Rn+n1+n2−j−l−x−yc,d T k+mc,ch,dRn−k−mc,ch,d T z+wt Rx+y−z−wt a†1,h
l
a†1,v
j
b†1,h
k
b†1,v
m
d†3,h
u
d†3,v
z+w−u
c†2,h
r
c†2,v
x+y−z−w−r
× f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉. (A41)
Next, modes b1 and c2 interfere at the 50:50 BS within
the PQA. This BS transforms the state |φn〉a1b1;f1g1 ⊗
|ψn1,n2〉c2d3;p1q1 into the state |φn,n1,n2〉a1b2c3d3;f1g1p1q1
given by
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|φn,n1,n2〉a1b2c3d3;f1g1p1q1 =
1
n!
√
(n+ 1)n1!n2!
n∑
i=0
n1∑
x=0
n2∑
y=0
i∑
j=0
i∑
k=0
n−i∑
l=0
n−i∑
m=0
x∑
z=0
y∑
w=0
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u=0
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min{w,u}∑
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s
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a
)(
x+ y − z − w − r
b
)(
k
c
)(
m
d
)
T j+l+x+yc,d R
n+n1+n2−j−l−x−y
c,d T
k+m
c,ch,dR
n−k−m
c,ch,d
× T z+wt Rx+y−z−wt a†1,h
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a†1,v
j
d†3,h
u
d†3,v
z+w−u
b†2,h
a+c
b†2,v
b+d
c†3,h
k+r−a−c
c†3,v
x+y+m−z−w−r−b−d
f†1,h
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f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
× g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉. (A42)
As in the case of the ESR-based setup, Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement settings can be incorporated at this
stage by rotating the pairs of operators (a†1,h, a
†
1,v) and
(d†3,h, d
†
3,v) with angles θA and θB, respectively. We de-
note the resulting pure state by |φn,n1,n2〉θA,θBa2b2c3d4;f1g1p1q1 ,
and it is given by
|φn,n1,n2〉θA,θBa2b2c3d4;f1g1p1q1 =
1
n!
√
(n+ 1)n1!n2!
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l
)(
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w
)(
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)(
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v
)(
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)(
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)(
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c
)(
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d
)(
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)(
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)
T j+l+x+yc,d R
n+n1+n2−j−l−x−y
c,d T
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c,ch,dR
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t R
x+y−z−w
t cos θA
e+j−2h sin θAl+2h−e
× cos θBo+z+w−u−2n˜ sin θBu+2n˜−oa†2,h
e
a†2,v
l+j−e
d†4,h
o
d†4,v
z+w−o
b†2,h
a+c
b†2,v
b+d
c†3,h
k+r−a−c
c†3,v
x+y+m−z−w−r−b−d
× f†1,h
n−i−l
f†1,v
i−j
g†1,h
i−k
g†1,v
n−i−m
p†1,h
n1−x
q†1,v
n2−y|0〉. (A43)
Then, in an identical way as in the ESR-based setup,
the probability P (~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB that a specific click
pattern ~α = (α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ) occurs with the state
written in Eq. (A43) is given by
P (~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB =
∥∥∥|φ˜n,n1,n2〉θA,θB~α;f1g1p1q1∥∥∥2 , (A44)
where the unnormalized state |φ˜n,n1,n2〉
θA,θB
~α;f1g1p1q1
has the
form
|φ˜n,n1,n2〉
θA,θB
~α;f1g1p1q1
= 〈~α|φn,n1,n2〉θA,θBa2b2c3d4;f1g1p1q1 ,
(A45)
being |~α〉 = |α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ〉.
After addressing the relevant orthogonality relation,
given by
〈~α|a†2,h
e
a†2,v
l+j−e
d†4,h
o
d†4,v
z+w−o
c†3,h
k+r−a−c
× c†3,v
x+y+m−z−w−r−b−d
b†2,h
a+c
b†v
b+d|0〉
= (α!β!γ!δ!µ!ν!τ !λ!)
1/2
δeαδ
l+j−e
β δ
o
γδ
z+w−o
δ δ
k+r−a−c
µ
× δx+y+m−z−w−r−b−dν δa+cτ δb+dλ , (A46)
one finds that the state |φ˜n,n1,n2〉
θA,θB
~α;f1g1p1q1
can be written
as
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|φ˜n,n1,n2〉
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=
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n2−y|0〉. (A47)
Finally, by taking the squared norm of the previous state as decribed in Eq. (A44), we obtain that
P (~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB =
α!β!γ!δ!µ!ν!τ !λ!
(n+ 1)2µ+ν+τ+λ
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)2(n˜+N˜)+u+U
×Υ(n, n1, n2, i, x, y, j, k, w,W, u, U, v, V, s, S, a,A, b, B, h,H, n˜, N˜ ,∆, α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ), (A48)
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where
Υ(n, n1, n2, i, x, y, j, k, w,W, u, U, v, V, s, S, a,A, b, B, h,H, n˜, N˜ ,∆, α, β, γ, δ, µ, ν, τ, λ) = n1!n2!i!(i+ ∆)!(n− i)!
× (n− i−∆)!
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)(
µ+ τ − k −∆
A
)(
x+ y + k − γ − δ − µ− τ
b
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)(
γ + δ − U
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[(α− h)!(α−H)!(β + h− j)!(β +H − j −∆)!h!H!(j − h)!(j + ∆−H)!]−1
× [(n1 − x)!(n2 − y)!(i− j)!(i− k)!(n+ j − i− α− β)!(n+ x+ y + k − i− γ − δ − µ− ν − τ − λ)!(u− v)!]
−1
(γ + δ + v − u− w)!(γ + δ + V − U −W )!v!V !(w − v)!(W − V )!(µ+ τ − k − s)!(µ+ τ − k −∆− S)!
× [(x+ w + k + s− γ − δ − µ− τ)!(x+W + k + ∆ + S − γ − δ − µ− τ)!(y − w − s)!(y −W − S)!s!S!(τ − a)!]
−1
(k + a− τ)!(k + ∆ +A− τ)!(b+ γ + δ + µ+ ν + τ − x− y − k)!(B + γ + δ + µ+ ν + τ − x− y − k −∆)!
× [(U − V )!(τ −A)!]
−1
(λ− b)!(λ−B)! . (A49)
The normalization condition
∑
~α P (~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB =
1 holds for any set of physical parameters θA, θB, ζc,d,
ζc,ch,d and t, and only those click patterns ~α such that
α+ β ≤ n, γ + δ ≤ n1 + n2 and γ + δ + µ+ ν + τ + λ ≤
n+ n1 + n2 have a nonzero probability to happen due to
the fact that for the moment we have disregarded dark
counts.
As a final step, we need to define the click pattern
distribution in the noisy scenario, p˜ (~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB ,
as well as the post-processed click pattern distribution,
P(A~α|n, n1, n2)θA,θB (with A~α = (AA, AB, µ, ν, τ, λ)).
This is exactly analogous to what we did for the ESR-
based setup in Appendix A 1 a, and we omit the details
here for simplicity. The only difference is that no per-
mutation step α ↔ β is performed in this case. This is
so because, conditioned on a successful heralding event,
Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are expected to be directly
correlated in this case.
c. Parameters PSH, Q|SH and ω|SH
To determine PSH, we note that any given detection
event is discarded unless a trigger is observed at the
idler mode of both single photon sources and, at the
same time, a success occurs at the PQA. Therefore,
and due to the symmetries of the channel model un-
der consideration, we can define, say the event Ω =
{(µ, ν, τ, λ) = (1, 1, 0, 0)} (as we did in Appendix A 1 b)
and thus the overall success probability is given by
PSH = 4PΩ,double trigger = 4P
2
triggerPΩ|double trigger,
(A50)
where the conditional probability PΩ|double trigger has the
form
PΩ|double trigger =
∑
AA,AB
P(AA, AB,Ω|double trigger)θA,θB
=
∑
n,n1,n2
pnrn1rn2
∑
AA,AB
P(AA, AB,Ω|n, n1, n2)θA,θB ,
(A51)
with AA, AB ∈ {0, 1}. On the other hand, we have that
the conditional QBER reads
Q|Ω,double trigger = P(0, 1,Ω)0,0 +P(1, 0,Ω)0,0
PΩ|double trigger
=
1
PΩ|double trigger
∑
n,n1,n2
pnrn1rn2
[
P(0, 1,Ω|n, n1, n2)0,0
+P(1, 0,Ω|n, n1, n2)0,0
]
. (A52)
Similarly, the conditional winning probability reads
ω|Ω,double trigger = S|Ω,double trigger/8 + 1/2, where
S|Ω,double trigger = E0,−pi8 |Ω + E0,pi8 |Ω − Epi4 ,−pi8 |Ω,
+ Epi
4 ,
pi
8
|Ω (A53)
and the quantities EθA,θB |Ω are given by
EθA,θB |Ω =
2
PΩ|double trigger
∑
n,n1,n2
pnrn1rn2
× [P(0, 0,Ω|n, n1, n2)θA,θB +P(1, 1,Ω|n, n1, n2)θA,θB ]
− 1. (A54)
Note that in Eq. (A53) the summand that carries the mi-
nus sign is different from that of Eq. (A27). As already
explained in Appendix A 1 b, the definition of the con-
ditional CHSH violation depends on the particular Bell
pair shared by the parties after a successful BSM [57].
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3. DIQKD without heralding mechanism
In this Appendix, we calculate the maximum channel
loss that a photonic DIQKD implementation can toler-
ate in the absence of an heralding mechanism. For that
purpose, we consider the setup where Bob does not hold
a qubit amplifier in his lab, as shown by Fig. 13. Also,
since we are interested in the maximum achievable dis-
tance, we further assume perfect coupling and detection
efficiencies, i.e., ηc = ηd = 1, and no detector noise, i.e.,
pd = 0. In this way, channel loss is the only source of
loss that we contemplate, modeled by a transmission ef-
ficiency ηch = 10
−Λ/10 as usual.
In the case of a perfect entanglement source, ρab =
|φ1〉ab〈φ1| (see Eq. (2)) we have that the parameters
of the honest implementation are simply given by Q =
(1 − ηch)/2 and ω = (
√
2ηch + 2)/4, so that the maxi-
mum tolerated channel loss is given by Λmax = max{Λ ∈
R+|K∞ ≥ 0} ≈ 0.7dB, where K∞ is the asymptotic se-
cret key rate in the absence of a qubit amplifier,
K∞ = 1− h
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω(ω − 1) + 3
]
− h(Q). (A55)
If we assume, for instance, an attenuation coefficient of,
say, α = 0.2 dB/km, which corresponds to the typical
value for single-mode fibers in the telecom wavelength,
then Λmax = 0.7 dB means that the maximum achiev-
able distance between the parties in the DIQKD link is
Lmax = 3.5 km.
Let us now consider the case where ρab is a more gen-
eral entanglement source, ρab = |ψ〉ab〈ψ|, with |ψ〉ab
given by Eq. (1) and some arbitrary photon num-
ber statistics pn. Then, by using the same tech-
niques employed in Appendix A 1 and in Appendix A 2,
it is possible to derive the click pattern distribution
P (α, β, γ, δ|n)θA,θB that matches the setup of Fig. (13),
conditioned on the number of photon pairs n emitted by
the source. Precisely, one finds
P (α, β, γ, δ|n)θA,θB = δnα+βP˜ (α, β, γ, δ|n)θA,θB , (A56)
where
P˜ (α, β, γ, δ|n)θA,θB =
α!β!γ!δ!
n+ 1
ηγ+δch (1− ηch)n−γ−δ cos θA2α sin θA2(n−α) cos θB2γ sin θB2δ
n∑
j=0
n−j∑
∆=−j
min{n−j,γ+δ,γ+δ+∆}∑
l=max{0,γ+δ−j,∆}
×
min{α,j}∑
h=max{0,α+j−n}
min{α,j+∆}∑
H=max{0,α+j+∆−n}
min{γ,l}∑
s=max{0,l−δ}
min{γ,l−∆}∑
S=max{0,l−δ−∆}
(−1)h+H+s+S+∆
(
sin θA
cos θA
)2(h+H−j)−∆
×
(
sin θB
cos θB
)2(s+S−l)+∆
Υ(n, j, l, h,H, s, S, α, β, γ, δ,∆), (A57)
with the parameter Υ(n, j, l, h,H, s, S, α, β, γ, δ,∆) being of the form
Υ(n, j, l, h,H, s, S, α, β, γ, δ,∆) =
(
n− j
α− h
)(
n− j −∆
α−H
)(
j
h
)(
j + ∆
H
)
[(j + l − γ − δ)!(n− j − l)!(γ − s)!(γ − S)!]−1
× [(s+ δ − l)!(S + δ + ∆− l)!s!S!(l − s)!(l −∆− S)!]−1 . (A58)
Then, summing over n and taking into account the δnα+β
factor, we obtain that the overall distribution reads
P (α, β, γ, δ)θA,θB =
∞∑
n=0
pnP (α, β, γ, δ|n)θA,θB
= pα+βP˜ (α, β, γ, δ|α+ β)θA,θB . (A59)
As in Appendix (A 1 a), a permutation step is required to
enforce correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes.
Therefore, we define
p˜ (α, β, γ, δ)θA,θB = P (β, α, γ, δ)θA,θB . (A60)
Given p˜ (α, β, γ, δ)θA,θB , one can readily define the post-
processed click pattern distribution P(AA, AB)θA,θB by
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simply summing over all click patterns (α, β, γ, δ) that
are mapped to a specific pair of deterministic assign-
ments, (AA, AB), as we are assuming here that pd = 0.
Once this is done, it is straightforward to define the pa-
rameters of the honest implementation.
In particular, we have that
Q = P(0, 1)0,0 +P(1, 0)0,0. (A61)
On the other hand, ω = S/8+1/2, where in this case the
CHSH violation reads S = E0,−pi8 +E0,pi8 −Epi4 ,−pi8 +Epi4 ,pi8
and
EθA,θB = 2 [P(0, 0)θA,θB +P(1, 1)θA,θB ]− 1. (A62)
In doing so, one can numerically compute the maxi-
mum tolerated channel loss for any given photon-number
statistics pn. For instance, in the case of PDC sources,
the statistics read pn = (n + 1)λ
n(1 + λ)−n−2, so that
Λmax = max{Λ ∈ R+|K∞ ≥ 0}. In this scenario, how-
ever, the definition of K∞ includes a maximization over
the free parameter λ characterizing the intensity of the
PDC source, i.e.,
K∞ = max
λ∈R+
{
1− h
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω(ω − 1) + 3
]
− h(Q)
}
.
(A63)
In this way, we find Λmax ≈ 0.4 dB, which results in
a maximum transmission distance Lmax ≈ 2 km for an
attenuation coefficient α = 0.2 dB/km.
FIG. 13: Schematic of the DIQKD setup without a
qubit amplifier. Since we are interested in determining
the maximum achievable distance, detection and
coupling efficiencies are assumed to be perfect, i.e.,
ηc = ηd = 1, and detector noise is set to zero, i.e.,
pd = 0. Again, ηch tags the transmission efficiency of
the channel, ηch = 10
−Λ/10, the symbol “⊕” represents
the PBSs, the greek letters in red color identify the
number of photons observed at each of the detectors
and |0〉 denotes the vacuum state.
4. DIQKD with two qubit amplifiers
Finally, in this Appendix we consider a different setup
from that presented in Fig. 2, i.e., we now assume that
the entanglement source ρab is located in the middle
of the channel, equidistant from Alice’s and Bob’s labs.
Also, we suppose that both parties hold an ESR-based
qubit amplifier to palliate the effect of the channel loss
(the case with two PQAs is briefly discussed afterwards
also below). The goal is to investigate whether or not
such setup could increase the maximum transmission dis-
tance before the secret key rate sharply drops to zero.
Intuitively speaking, the cutoff point where the secret
key rate drops down to zero happens at the range of
distances for which a significant fraction of the successful
heralding events at the qubit amplifier are triggered by
the dark counts of the detectors. In this scenario, the
conditional quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after
a successful heralding takes place is a separable state,
thus leading to a vanishing conditional secret key rate.
In the setup with a central source ρab and two qubit
amplifiers, the input signal to each qubit amplifier has
only traveled a half of the overall transmission distance,
so the probability of still carrying a photon that hits a
detector within the amplifier may still be large compared
to that of a dark count, and this could lead to an en-
hancement of the transmission distance. Of course, one
also expects that the overall secret key rate decreases, as
the probability to have a simultaneous successful herald-
ing event at both qubit amplifiers is lower than that of a
single success in a unique qubit amplifier, as required in
the setup given by Fig. 2. Nevertheless, it takes longer
distances for the conditional secret key rate to sharply
drop down to zero, since it comes from an entangled state
with a higher probability than in the setup of Fig. 2. As
a result, the cutoff point is shifted to further distances.
For instance, in the case where ρab is an ideal entangle-
ment source, the setup with two qubit amplifiers roughly
doubles the maximum distance without significantly af-
fecting the secret key rate. This is illustrated by the
bluish lines in Fig. 14, where we compare the secret key
rate with one and two qubit amplifiers as a function of
the channel loss. Here, as in the previous examples, we
set the dark count rate to pd = 10
−7. Also, we assume
the security settings given by the set S1, and we evalu-
ate the same two examples used in Sec. V. From Fig. 14
we have that, if ideal entanglement sources were avail-
able, it would actually be beneficial to use two ESRs for
long-distance transmissions. Similar conclusions would
be obtained if two PQAs were used instead.
However, this might not be the case if one considers
practical light sources with a nonzero probability of emit-
ting multi-photon pulses. For example, in the case of
PDC sources, it turns out that the use of two qubit am-
plifiers does not seem to improve the performance of the
system in a practical regime. This is exemplified by the
yellowish lines in Fig. 14, which again correspond to the
same examples as in Sec. V with the security settings S1.
Precisely, Fig. 14(a) shows that no advantage is obtained
with two qubit amplifiers in a practical key rate regime
in this scenario. Arguably, one would expect to see an
advantage by considering lower detection and coupling
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FIG. 14: Comparison between the performance of the
DIQKD scheme with one and two ESR-based qubit
amplifiers for ideal sources (bluish lines) and for PDC
sources (yellowish lines). In both cases, solid (dotted)
lines are used for the case with one (two) qubit
amplifiers. For illustration purposes, here we consider
the same combinations of parameters ηc,d and nSH like
in Sec. V. Also, we suppose the less demanding set of
security requirements given by S1. (a) Secret key rate
as a function of the channel loss. (b) Average number of
transmitted signals as a function of the channel loss.
efficiencies or higher dark count rates, as in both situa-
tions the cutoff point where the key rate sharply drops to
zero is shifted to lower distances. Nevertheless, these two
scenarios are notably restricted by time considerations.
To see this, in Fig. 14(b) we plot the average number
of transmitted signals 〈N〉 required to achieve the secret
key rates of Fig. 14(a), comparing again the cases of one
and two ESRs. As expected, using two qubit amplifiers
instead of one demands longer DIQKD sessions in order
to harvest a specific block size, due to the requirement
of having simultaneous successful heralding events. In
fact, even for ηc,d = 100% and nSH = 10
9, the necessary
value of 〈N〉 is larger than 1015 for a channel loss as low
as Λ ≈ 4 dB, and any lower value of the detection and
coupling efficiencies would result in smaller values of Λ.
This being the case, even if one considers higher values
of the dark count rate pd, no advantage is expected from
the setup with two qubit amplifiers within such a short
channel loss interval (before the duration of the DIQKD
session becomes impractical).
Indeed, if one considers two PQAs instead of two ESRs
and compares again this setup with the one that uses
a single PQA, the time constraint with PDC sources
becomes even more strict, as each PQA additionally
includes two triggered single-photon sources that must
yield a success in their idler mode in order not to dismiss
a detection event. That is, a setup with two PQAs re-
quires the trigger of four single-photon sources and two
simultaneous successful BSMs afterwards. As a result,
this overall decrease of the success probability (which
is particularly relevant for PDC sources) translates into
larger values of 〈N〉 which seem to render this solution
impractical.
In short, the potential advantage of using two qubit
amplifiers to enhance further the distance covered with
DIQKD strongly depends on the photon-number statis-
tics of the entanglement sources under consideration. In
this sense, although Fig. (14) is restricted to ideal sources
and PDC sources, we include below all the necessary cal-
culations to evaluate the case of general photon-number
statistics, maintaining the form of the states given in
Eqs. (1) and (2). In this regard, we remark that the re-
sults are similar to those illustrated in Sec. V C, i.e., by
reducing the probability to emit multiple photon pulses
with respect to that of PDC sources, one could approach
the behaviour of ideal sources shown in Fig. (14).
a. Click pattern distribution
A schematic of the DIQKD setup with a central
source and assisted by two ESR-based qubit amplifiers
is shown in Fig. 15. Using the same techniques em-
ployed in Appendixes A 1 and A 2, it is possible to
derive the click pattern distribution that matches the
setup of Fig. 15, conditioned on the numbers of pho-
ton pairs n1, n2 and n3 emitted by the entanglement
sources σab, σef and σcd, respectively. Precisely, let
us define the click pattern (in vector notation) as ~α =
(α, β, γ, δ, µA, νA, τA, λA, µB, νB, τB, λB), where µA, νA,
τA and λA (µB, νB, τB and λB) are the numbers of pho-
tons recorded within Alice’s (Bob’s) ESR in any given
detection event, while α and β (γ and δ) denote again
the numbers of photons she (he) observes with the de-
tectors in her (his) lab when performing a measurement
with rotation angle θA (θB). In particular, one finds that
P (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB reads
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FIG. 15: Schematic of the DIQKD protocol with a central source and two ESR-based qubit amplifiers. The central
source is denoted by σab, while σef (σcd) stands for the source within the ESR held by Alice (Bob). As usual, θA
(θB) denotes the rotation angle of Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement settings and ζc,d and ζc,ch,d tag the effective
efficiency parameters, ζc,d = ηcηd and ζc,ch,d = ηcηchηd, where ηc, ηd and ηch denote the transmittance of the BSs
modeling the coupling loss, the detection loss and the channel loss, respectively. The symbol “⊕” is used again to
indicate the PBSs, the greek letters in red color tag the number of photons observed at each of the detectors and |0〉
stands for the vacuum state. Two dashed grey rectangles identify the two ESRs, ESRA and ESRB.
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P (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB =
α!β!γ!δ!µA!νA!τA!λA!µB!νB!τB!λB!
(n1 + 1)(n2 + 1)(n3 + 1)2µA+νA+τA+λA+µB+νB+τB+λB
ζα+β+γ+δ+µA+νA+τA+λA+µB+νB+τB+λBc,d
× (1− ζc,d)2(n2+n3)−α−β−γ−δ−µA−νA−τA−λA−µB−νB−τB−λB(1− ζc,ch,d)2n1 cos θA−2β sin θA2(α+2β) cos θB−2δ sin θB2(γ+2δ)
×
n1∑
i1=0
n2∑
i2=0
n3∑
i3=0
min{n1−i1,i2,n3−i3}∑
∆=max{−i1,i2−n2,−i3}
min{i1,νA+λA,νA+λA−∆}∑
j1=max{0,−∆,νA+λA−i2}
min{i1,µB+τB,µB+τB−∆}∑
j′1=max{0,−∆,µB+τB+i3−n3}
min{i2,α+β,α+β+∆}∑
j′2=max{0,∆,α+β+i2−n2}
×
min{i3,γ+δ,γ+δ−∆}∑
j′3=max{0,−∆,γ+δ+i3−n3}
min{n1−i1,µA+τA,µA+τA+∆}∑
l=max{0,∆,µA+τA+i2−n2}
min{n1−i1,νB+λB,νB+λB+∆}∑
l′=max{0,∆,νB+λB−i3}
min{l,µA}∑
k=max{0,l−τA}
min{l−∆,µA}∑
K=max{0,l−τA−∆}
×
min{j1,νA}∑
m=max{0,j1−λA}
min{j1+∆,νA}∑
M=max{0,j1+∆−λA}
min{j′1,µB}∑
p=max{0,j′1−τB}
min{j′1+∆,µB}∑
P=max{0,j′1+∆−τB}
min{l′,νB}∑
q=max{0,l′−λB}
min{l′−∆,νB}∑
Q=max{0,l′−∆−λB}
min{β,α+β−j′2}∑
s=max{0,β−j′2}
×
min{β,α+β−j′2+∆}∑
S=max{0,β−j′2+∆}
min{δ,γ+δ−j′3}∑
z=max{0,δ−j′3}
min{δ,γ+δ−j′3−∆}∑
Z=max{0,δ−j′3−∆}
(−1)k+K+m+M+p+P+q+Q+s+S+z+Z+∆
[
ζc,ch,d(1− ζc,d)
ζc,d(1− ζc,ch,d)
]j1+l+j′1+l′
×
(
sin θA
cos θA
)∆−2(j′2+s+S)( sin θB
cos θB
)−2(j′3+z+Z)−∆
×Υ(n1, n2, n3, i1, i2, i3, j1, j′1, j′2, j′3, l, l′, k,K,m,M, p, P, q,Q, s, S, z, Z, α, β, γ, δ, µA, νA, τA, λA, µB, νB, τB, λB,∆),
(A64)
with
Υ(n1, n2, n3, i1, i2, i3, j1, j
′
1, j
′
2, j
′
3, l, l
′, k,K,m,M, p, P, q,Q, s, S, z, Z, α, β, γ, δ, µA, νA, τA, λA, µB, νB, τB, λB,∆) =
i1!(n1 − i1)!(i1 + ∆)!(n1 − i1 −∆)!i2!(n2 − i2)!(i2 −∆)!(n2 − i2 + ∆)!i3!(n3 − i3)!(i3 + ∆)!(n3 − i3 −∆)!
(i1 − j′1)!(i1 − j1)!(n1 − i1 − l)!(n1 − i1 − l′)!(i2 − νA − λA + j1)!(n2 − i2 − µA − τA + l)!(n2 − i2 − α− β + j′2)!
× [(i3 − j
′
3)!(n3 − i3 − µB − τB + j′1)!(n3 − i3 − γ − δ + j′3)!(i3 − νB − λB + l′)!(δ − z)!(δ − Z)!z!Z!(j′3 − δ + z)!S!]−1
(i2 − j′2)!(j′3 + ∆− δ + Z)!(γ + δ − j′3 − z)!(γ + δ − j′3 −∆− Z)!(β − s)!(β − S)!(j′2 − β + s)!(j′2 −∆− β + S)!s!
× [(α+ β − j
′
2 − s)!(α+ β − j′2 + ∆− S)!k!K!(l − k)!(l −∆−K)!(µA − k)!(µA −K)!(τA − l + k)!]−1
m!M !(j1 −m)!(j1 + ∆−M)!(νA −m)!(νA −M)!(λA − j1 +m)!(λA − j1 −∆ +M)!p!P !(j′1 − p)!(j′1 + ∆− P )!
× [(τA − l + ∆ +K)!(µB − P )!(τB − j′1 + p)!(τB − j′1 −∆ + P )!q!Q!(l′ − q)!(l′ −∆−Q)!(νB − q)!(νB −Q)!]−1
× [(µB − p)!(λB − l′ + q)!(λB − l′ + ∆ +Q)!]−1. (A65)
The normalization condition
∑
~α P (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB =
1 holds for any set of physical parameters θA, θB, ζc,d,
and ζc,ch,d, and only those click patterns ~α such that
α+β ≤ n2, γ+δ ≤ n3, µA +νA +τA +λA ≤ n1 + n2 and
µB + νB + τB + λB ≤ n1 + n3 have a nonzero probabil-
ity to happen, since we have disregarded dark counts so
far. If we incorporate now the noise model introduced in
the main text, the click pattern distribution in the noisy
scenario becomes
P˜ (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB = (1− 12pd)P (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB
+pd
∑
~σ∈Γ~α P (~σ|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB +O(p2d), (A66)
where, again, Γ~α = {~σ : |~α| = |~σ|+ 1} and, for an arbi-
trary ~α, |~α| = α+ β + γ + δ+ µA + νA + τA + λA + µB +
νB + τB + λB. Coming next, by defining
p˜ (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB = P˜α↔β (~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB , (A67)
we flip Alice’s outcomes to enforce direct correlation
with Bob’s, and by summing over all click patterns ~α
that are mapped to the pair of deterministic assign-
ments (AA, AB), we finally obtain the post-processed
click pattern distribution, P(A~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB . In ac-
cordance with Appendixes A 1 a and A 2 b, A~α is defined
as A~α = (AA, AB, µA, νA, τA, λA, µB, νB, τB, λB). Note
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that if we sum over all possible photon numbers n1, n2
and n3 and assume arbitrary statistics for the entangle-
ment sources, say pn1 , p
′
n2 and p
′′
n3 , we obtain the overall
distribution
P(A~α)θA,θB =
∑
n1,n2,n3
pn1p
′
n2p
′′
n3P(A~α|n1, n2, n3)θA,θB .
(A68)
b. Parameters PSH, Q|SH and ω|SH
In contrast to the setup with a single qubit ampli-
fier, two BSMs are performed in the current scenario,
one per ESR (see Fig. (15)). Therefore, given that
four different click patterns are considered to be suc-
cessful heralding events in each qubit amplifier, there
exist sixteen events that are not discarded by either
Alice or Bob, corresponding to those cases for which
both (µA, νA, τA, λA) and (µB, νB, τB, λB) belong to the
set {(1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1)}. Let Ω be
one of them, say,
Ω =
{
(µA, νA, τA, λA, µB, νB, τB, λB)
= (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
}
. (A69)
Then, due to the symmetries of the channel model, it
turns out that PSH = 16PΩ, ω|SH = ω|Ω and Q|SH = Q|Ω.
As in Appendix A 1 b, PΩ can be computed as
PΩ =
∑
AA,AB
P(AA, AB,Ω)0,0, (A70)
with AA, AB ∈ {0, 1}. Analogously,
Q|Ω = 1
PΩ
[P(0, 1,Ω)0,0 +P(1, 0,Ω)0,0], (A71)
and ω|Ω = S|Ω/8 + 1/2 with the conditional CHSH vio-
lation given by
S|Ω = E0,−pi8 |Ω + E0,pi8 |Ω − Epi4 ,−pi8 |Ω + Epi4 ,pi8 |Ω, (A72)
being
EθA,θB |Ω =
2
PΩ
[P(0, 0,Ω)θA,θB +P(1, 1,Ω)θA,θB ]− 1.
(A73)
Note that, with our choice of Ω, it is the third summand
that carries the minus sign in Eq. (A72).
Appendix B: Entropy rate function and error
correction leakage
In this Appendix we provide the explicit expressions for
the functions ηopt and leakIR which appear in the secret
key length formula given by Eq. (17). In particular, we
have that [28]
ηopt(ω|SH, nSH, γ, δest, s/4, EA + IR) =
max
3
4<pt<
2+
√
2
4
η
(
ω|SHγ − δest
γ
, pt, nSH, γ, s/4, EA + IR
)
,
(B1)
where the function η(p, pt, nSH, γ, 1, 2) has the form
η(p, pt, nSH, γ, 1, 2) = fmin(p, pt)− 2√
nSH
×
[
log 13 +
1
γ
dg(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
pt
]
×
√
1− 2 log(12). (B2)
In this equation, the function fmin(p, pt) is given by
fmin(p, pt) =

g(p) p < pt
g(pt) +
dg(p)
dp
∣∣∣∣
pt
(p− pt) p ≥ pt, (B3)
and the function g(p) has the form
g(p) = 1− h
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
16p(p− 1) + 3
]
, (B4)
where the winning probability p lies in the interval 0 ≤
p ≤ (2 +√2)/4, and h(x) is the binary entropy function
introduced in the main text.
The function leakIR, on the other hand, can be written
as
leakIR(Q|SH, ω|SH, nSH, γ, IR, IRrob) =
nSH[(1− γ)h(Q|SH) + γh(ω|SH)]
+ 4
√
nSH log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√√√√2 log [ 8
′IR
2
]
+ log
[
8
′IR
2 +
2
2− ′IR
]
+ log
(
1
IR
)
, (B5)
where IRrob = 
′
IR + IR.
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